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In this thesis, I will argue that Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), a United States
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INTRODUCTION

In 1969, Judith Rooks, a Feminist activist and member of Georgia Citizens for Hospital
Abortion, took to the steps of the state’s capitol building and announced during a live press
conference that “because the Georgia legislature had turned its back on the health needs of
Georgia women, [the Georgia Citizens for Hospital Abortion] would establish a counseling
service to provide information and arrange legal abortions in Washington D.C. or New York for
Georgia women who could not access necessary health services” in Georgia.1 Concurrently,
feminists and activists in Georgia began preparing for their own legal challenge to the state’s
liberalized abortion law, setting the stage for what would later become Doe v. Bolton (1972), a
companion case to Roe v. Wade (1972). Argued and decided the same day as the more famous
Roe v. Wade, Doe has its own important points of distinction on the issue of abortion. Despite its
significance in the history of abortion rights, Doe has continued to be overlooked by most
scholars since the day the pair of decisions came down. This moment on the Capitol steps
reflects much larger concerns surrounding female reproductive control in a male dominated
government: what is the ultimate impact of a state attempt to control reproduction? What are the
costs? And what responses can it inspire?
In this thesis, I will argue that Doe v. Bolton allowed oppressed women to seize control of
their reproductive rights, a crucial step in the march toward equality. The work of Georgia
feminists in cooperation with the medical community, specifically at the Centers for Disease
Control and Grady Hospital, can illuminate the impact of Georgia’s liberalized abortion statute
on historically marginalized groups. In addition, a closer look at this neglected chapter in the
abortion rights struggle will reveal the important work of Georgia feminists and the local medical
1

Judith Rooks, interview by Janet Paulk, 26 April 2004, Judith Rooks, Donna Novak Coles Georgia Women’s
Movement Archives, Georgia Women’s Movement Oral History Project, Box 3, Special Collections and Archives,
Georgia State University, Atlanta.

2

community and how they shaped attorney Margie Pitts Hames’ arguments before the Supreme
Court.2 Also through reexamination, increased understanding of Doe in relation to the larger
abortion rights struggle of the twentieth century can be discerned, most significantly what the
implications of the decision mean for future laws relating to abortion access.
1.1

Historiography
As recently as forty years ago, topics like sexuality, reproduction, contraception, and

abortion were rarely viewed as appropriate topics for historical study. Writing in 1965, social
historians only had two serious books as resources on reproductive control in the past: Norman
E. Himes’ Medical History of Contraception, and Frederick Taussig’s Abortion, Spontaneous
and Induced: Medical and Social Aspects.3 Both books were written from a medical perspective,
and remained the only texts since their publication in 1936.4 In the years since, there have been
multitudes of historical studies about sexuality, reproduction, contraception, and abortion.
Depending on one’s perspective, the narrative of this history can be separated into two camps.
The more liberal camp argues that over the past few decades women have made significant
strides in the area of reproductive rights, and conversely, the conservative camp presents a
narrative where traditional values are in sharp decline as a result of increased availability of

2

The Oyez Project. “Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) Oral Argument.” Last visited May 3, 2013,
http://www.oyez.org/ cases /1970-1979/1971/1971_70_40; The Oyez Project. “Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
Oral Reargument.” Last visited May 3, 2013, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_40; John D.
Asher, M.D., “Abortion Surveillance in a Metropolitan Hospital: First Year’s Findings.” Margie Pitts Hames Papers,
Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University; Roger W. Rochat, M.D., Carl W. Tyler, Jr., M.D., and
Albert K. Schoenbucher, M.D., “An Epidemiological Analysis of Abortion in Georgia,” American Journal of Public
Health 61, no. 3 (1971); Judith Rooks, interview by Janet Paulk, 26 April 2004, Judith Rooks, Donna Novak Coles
Georgia Women’s Movement Archives, Georgia Women’s Movement Oral History Project, Box 3, Special
Collections and Archives, Georgia State University, Atlanta.
3
Norman E. Hines, Medical History of Contraception (New York: Schocken Books, 1970) and Frederick Taussig,
Abortion, Spontaneous and Induced: Medical and Social Aspects (New York: C. V. Mosby Company, 1936). Both
books are discussed in James C. Mohr’s historiographic review of abortion literature (James C. Mohr, “Sexuality,
Reproduction, Contraception, and Abortion: A Review of Recent Literature,” Journal of Women’s History 8, no. 1
(1996): 172.)
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contraception and wider access to abortions. Both sides of the debate present contraception and
abortion as new concerns in American history. However, historians recognize that these are not
new issues and neither the practice of abortion nor the use of contraception was invented in the
twentieth century.
Historians have traced the earliest mentions of abortion in law to early modern English
and colonial law, where the purpose was to protect the potential mother from the abortionist.
Women who attempted or had successful abortions that resulted in their own death were viewed
as victims, and instead, the abortionist was charged with the felony. If an abortion successfully
killed a “viable” fetus, it was a serious misdemeanor. To prove such a crime, the pregnancy had
to be established before any charge could be brought for the attempted abortion. This could only
be accomplished with evidence of the quickening (movement in utero) of the fetus.5 Early
Judeo-Christian teachings were similar. In the Bible, a fine was levied on anyone performing an
abortion, and an abortionist faced death if the woman died. Talmudic scholars concluded that
there was no crime unless the fetus had quickened, but abortion was permitted if pregnancy
endangered the mother’s life. Early Islamic writers like Avicenna portrayed abortion as a birth
control method, yet by the early modern period, the Roman Catholic Church had declared their
disapproval of all contraception.6
Connecticut became the first state to criminalize abortion in 1821, and the primary
purpose of the law was to state the conditions under which the state could prosecute the
abortionist for an abortion. The law did not attempt to criminalize attempted abortions or
successful abortions before quickening, nor did it make the woman an accessory to the crime.7

5

N.E.H. Hull and Peter Charles Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy in American History
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 17.
6
Hull & Hoffer, 18.
7
Ibid., 20.
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Through the 1880s, more states passed anti-abortion statutes; many of these statutes now
declared all abortion attempts, all practitioners and accessories to abortion, and all providers or
advertisers of abortion paraphernalia subject to penalty.8 Concurrently, conservative social
activists such as Anthony Comstock gained influence in the United States. As part of the “social
purity movement,” Comstock was able to lobby Congress successfully for the passage of a bill
that strengthened federal law against sending obscene materials through the mail. The
amendments favored by Comstock came to be known as the federal Comstock Law. Obscene
items included literature relating to the prevention of pregnancy.9 Many states followed suit and
passed their own “little Comstock laws,” condemning different forms of obscenity, including
materials related to birth control. Responsible advocates of birth control maintained that
“Comstock’s efforts set back for decades the quest for circulating the best contraceptive advice
available.”10
Enacted in 1879, Connecticut’s “little Comstock” law “remained as a relic of a
Comstockian philosophy which had long since ceased to be widely held, if it ever had been.”11
The Connecticut statute would go on to be challenged and struck down in Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965), where the principle of a right to privacy was first formally elucidated by
Justice William O. Douglas, writing in his opinion that “the First Amendment has a penumbra
where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”12 The right to sexual privacy merely
deals with this right, as discussed by Justice Douglas, in regards to issues that arise from people’s
sexuality (i.e. reproductive rights, sexual conduct, etc.). Douglas believed that because these acts
8

Ibid., 34.
John W. Johnson, Griswold v. Connecticut: Birth Control and the Constitutional Right of Privacy (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2005), 7.
10
Ibid.
11
Thomas I. Emerson, “Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine,” The Right of Privacy: A Symposium (New York: Da
Capo, 1965), 23.
12
Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. at 483 (1965).
9
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took place in “zones of privacy,” they were protected. Such a right affects all in the United
States regardless of gender, marital status or sexual orientation and has significant implications
for a variety of individuals. It entails what is arguably the most private aspect of a person’s life,
granting everyone the choice of sexual partner and granting women control of their reproductive
abilities through birth control and abortions. The right to privacy was expanded for reproductive
rights gradually through the cases of Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), Roe v.
Wade (1973), and Doe v. Bolton (1973).
The right to privacy has foundations in various parts of the Constitution, specifically the
Fourteenth and the Ninth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment, known for the Due
Process Clause, asserts: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor to deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13 The Court utilizes this clause to recognize the
substantive due process, which facilitates liberty-based due process challenges that seek a certain
outcome. In general, substantive due process prohibits the government from infringing on
fundamental constitutional liberties. By contrast, procedural due process refers to the procedural
limitations placed on the manner in which a law is administered, applied, or enforced. Thus,
procedural due process prohibits the government from arbitrarily depriving individuals of legally
protected interests without first giving them notice and the opportunity to be heard.
The Ninth Amendment simply states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”14 This supports

13
14

U.S. Constitution, amend. 14, sec. 1.
U.S. Constitution, amend. 9.
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the arguments of some that due process liberty is an inclusive and open-ended phrase. Together,
these two amendments allow United States citizens to argue for the right to sexual privacy.
On the heels of Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird, the decision that
extended the right to privacy for birth control to unmarried women, followed Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton. In a seven-to-two vote, the Court found that the Texas statute Roe challenged
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doe v. Bolton differs from Roe
in how the Court compared the abortion procedure to other surgical procedures, noting that
Georgia’s law regulated abortion in ways that were unfathomable for other surgical procedures.
In addition, it made a point to emphasize the importance of the physician’s medical judgment
and conceived it broadly, allowing physicians to take into account emotional, psychological, and
“familial” factors. With this language, the Court promoted a medical model of abortion, placing
the abortion decision primarily in the hands of the physician, a move feminist scholars have
criticized for deemphasizing a woman’s personal and moral judgment. At its worst, these critics
argue that the medical model of abortion simply transfers authority over women’s bodies from
the state to the physician while keeping women disempowered. The language of Doe can be
used to further explore this belief and it’s veracity in the modern reproductive rights debate.
1.2

Method and Theory
In order to analyze the goals of Georgia feminists and Hames in Doe, a radical feminist

analysis will be used to explore the role of women’s oppression and its ties to reproductive
control. Kate Millet’s Sexual Politics provides a useful explanation of patriarchy and its role in
women’s oppression, connecting both to the institution of marriage and the traditional family
unit. As Millet discussed, the family acts as the chief institution of patriarchy, arguing that it is
“both a mirror of and a connection with the larger society; a patriarchal unit within a patriarchal

7

whole.”15 Serving as this agent, the family encourages its own members to conform and “act as
a unit in the government of the patriarchal state which rules its citizens through its family
heads.”16 The story of Doe is directly connected to that of women’s rights advocacy in Georgia.
Second wave feminists’ efforts to gain control of their reproduction and challenge the oppression
of women through the Georgia abortion statute can be seen throughout the history of Doe.
In this thesis, I will explain how second wave feminism influenced the work of activists
like Judith Rooks, who brought Mary Doe’s case to Margie Pitts Hames and how Hames’
argument before the Court was shaped by feminist concerns. Hames’ argument in Doe reflects
an undeniably feminist stance, in which she questioned the workings of patriarchy, namely its
hold over the family, and challenged it. For her, the nature of women’s reproduction is a
personal choice that should be free from interference by the male heteronormative government,
who attempted to pass legislation that restricted their reproductive rights in a last ditch effort to
save the family, patriarchy’s chief institution.
In addition, Shulamith Firestone’s feminist-Marxist interpretation of the modes of
production is also useful for examining the significance of women’s reproductive rights for
which Hames was arguing. Like Millet, Firestone agreed that there is a discriminatory sex class
system, privileging men over women, that can no longer be justified by argument that the
differences are based on nature, arguing, “Humanity has begun to outgrow nature.” 17 While
men are capable of ending the sex class system that has given them power over women and
children, they have little incentive to do so, making this a political problem. While there may no
longer be a relevant biological basis for the current sex class system, it does not mean the

15

Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000) 33.
Ibid.
17
Shulamith Firestone, “The Dialectic of Sex,” in Radical Feminism, ed. Barbara Crow (New York: New York
University Press, 2000), 94.
16
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exploitation of women and children will end. Feminists worried that fertility control could be
used against women to reinforce the system of exploitation in place for poor, young, unmarried,
and minority women. Firestone suggested that women needed to seize the means of production,
including “the full restoration to women of ownership of their own bodies, but also their seizure
of control of human fertility—the new population biology as well as all the social institutions of
childbearing and childrearing.”18 Hames’ fight on behalf of women in Georgia to gain such
control over their reproduction, challenges “the tyranny of the biological family,” uprooting the
basic social organization of patriarchal society.19

18
19

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Chapter 1: The Story of Jane

“In obtaining a legal abortion, to use the old cliché, it is not what you know but who you
know that matters . . . [C]ompetent doctors make their services discreetly available to their
middle class patients, and the informal networks circulate this information among people similar
in background, while poor women find only non-physicians or self-induced methods available to
them.”1

On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court handed down one of its most
controversial decisions of the twentieth century—Roe v. Wade. Recognized as the case that
secured the legal right for women to have abortions, it is the case everyone remembers when
discussing abortion rights. However, Roe v. Wade was not the only case dealing with abortion
the court decided that day. Doe v. Bolton, a case originating in Georgia, was argued and decided
the same days as Roe, and has its own merits that distinguish it from Roe. The case challenged
the state of Georgia’s liberalized yet restrictive 1968 abortion statute, which required women
seeking abortions to satisfy five specific requirements, making it especially difficult for
economically disadvantaged women and women of color to access safe, legal abortions in
Georgia. Margie Pitts Hames was the attorney who argued on behalf of Doe, and part of her
argument focused on the barriers to accessing safe abortions for these women. Hames suggested
that the state’s requirements drove up the cost of the procedure for women, forcing many either
to seek an illegal abortion or attempt to self-induce through other means, often with dangerous
outcomes. While some women hoped the new law would make abortions safer and easier to
access, the reality was that such safe and legal procedures were only available to those who
could afford it.
This chapter will explore the experience of women who sought abortions nationally and
in Georgia when it was illegal and then after the liberalized abortion laws were passed.
1

Nancy Howell Lee, The Search for an Abortionist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 167.
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Concerns that such laws negatively impacted these women were shared by feminists nationwide,
who responded in a variety of ways to address the resulting inequalities in access and care. By
illuminating the conditions women in Georgia faced trying to obtain legal and illegal abortions
the motivations of the Georgia feminists behind Doe v. Bolton can be better understood.
Historians have traced the earliest references of abortion in law to early modern English
and colonial law, where the purpose was to protect the potential mother from the abortionist.
Women who attempted or had successful abortions that resulted in their own death were viewed
as victims, and instead, the abortionist was charged with the felony. If an abortion successfully
killed a “viable” fetus, it was a serious misdemeanor. To prove such a crime, the pregnancy had
to be established before any charge could be brought for the attempted abortion. This could only
be accomplished with evidence of the quickening (movement in utero) of the fetus. 2 Early
Judeo-Christian teachings were similar. In the Bible, a fine was levied on anyone performing an
abortion, and an abortionist faced death if the woman died. Talmudic scholars concluded that
there was no crime unless the fetus had quickened, but abortion was permitted if pregnancy
endangered the mother’s life. Early Islamic writers like Avicenna portrayed abortion as a birth
control method, yet by the early modern period, the Roman Catholic Church had declared its
disapproval of all contraception.3
The first English law outlawing all attempted abortions, at whatever stage of the
pregnancy, was passed in 1803. This statute was part of an attempt to codify a number of capital
crimes, including pickpocketing and stealing clothing items worth more than one shilling. As a
result, abortion or attempted abortion became an offense with a punishment of transportation to a
penal colony. The death of a quick fetus from abortion was manslaughter. The 1803 English
2

N.E.H. Hull and Peter Charles Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy in American History
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 17.
3
Hull & Hoffer, 18.
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law, however, did not immediately move to the United States. 4 It would be 1821 before
Connecticut became the first state to pass an anti-abortion statute criminalizing abortion.5
Concurrent with the growing anti-abortion movement, which will be explored later, conservative
social activists such as Anthony Comstock were gaining influence in the United States. As part
of the “social purity movement,” Comstock was able to lobby Congress successfully for the
passage of a bill that strengthened federal law against sending obscene materials through the
mail. The amendments favored by Comstock came to be known as the federal Comstock Law.
Obscene items included literature relating to the prevention of contraception.6 Many states
followed suit and passed their own “little Comstock laws,” condemning different forms of
obscenity, including materials related to birth control. Responsible advocates of birth control
maintained that “Comstock’s efforts set back for decades the quest for circulating the best
contraceptive advice available.”7
In its early conception, the Comstock Act of 1873 contained a physician’s exemption to
the section banning that possession, sale, or mailing of contraceptive devices, but during
discussion in the Senate, a Republican senator, William A. Buckingham, presented an
amendment that removed the medical exemption for birth control. Because there was little
discussion on the floor of the Senate, it is believed that senators may have been confused about
what the amendment sought to achieve. The amendment was approved, and the amended
Comstock Act was passed and sent to the House of Representatives. There, with no discussion

4

Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 20.
6
John W. Johnson, Griswold v. Connecticut: Birth Control and the Constitutional Right of Privacy (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2005), 7.
7
Ibid.
5
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about the substance of the bill, the House approved the entire bill, and it was signed into federal
law shortly thereafter.8
Enacted in 1879, Connecticut’s “little Comstock” law “remained as a relic of a
Comstockian philosophy which had long since ceased to be widely read, if it ever had been.”9
The Connecticut statute would go on to be challenged and struck down in Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965), where the principle of a right to privacy was first formally elucidated by
Justice William O. Douglas, writing in his opinion that “the First Amendment has a penumbra
where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”10 The right to sexual privacy merely
deals with the privacy right, as discussed by Justice Douglas, in regards to issues that arise from
people’s sexuality (i.e. reproductive rights, sexual conduct, etc.). Justice Douglas believed that
because these acts took place in “zones of privacy,” they were protected.11 Such a right affects
all in the United States regardless of their gender, marital status or sexual orientation and has
significant implications for a variety of individuals. It entails what is arguably the most private
aspect of a person’s life, granting everyone the choice of whom they engage in sexual conduct
with and women control of their reproductive abilities through birth control and abortions.
Margaret Sanger celebrated the Griswold decision, which made birth control legally
available to married couples. Sanger played a central role in funding the research that eventually
produced the birth control pill. Developed in the 1950s and commercially produced beginning in
the 1960s, the birth control pill promised the reproductive control so many women had hoped for
and provided a solution to the “Malthusian nightmare” of uncontrolled population growth among

8

Ibid., 16.
Thomas I. Emerson, “Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine,” The Right of Privacy: A Symposium (New York: Da
Capo, 1965), 23.
10
Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. at 483 (1965).
11
Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. at 484.
9
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the poor.12 The pill and other birth control options freed women’s sexuality from the fear of
unwanted pregnancy. While some critics suggested the pill was responsible for the “sexual
revolution,” historians like Andrea Tone and Elaine Tyler May agree that the social and cultural
issues of the 1960s were primed for changes in sexual behavior and the availability of the pill
merely accelerated such changes.13 More importantly though, the pill gave women of the period
a choice they did not previously have, which made the concept of choice central within the
emerging women-centered consciousness of second wave feminism.
2.1

Early Abortion Law in America
The history of abortion laws in America is complex, but knowing it, provides context for

the contemporary debate over abortion rights. In Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, constitutional
scholar Laurence H. Tribe sketches out the history of abortion in America, arguing that the
abortion debate is presented as “an insoluble conflict between two fundamental values: the right
of a fetus to live and the right of a woman to determine her own fate. … This vision of abortion
almost totally obscures the fact that these competing values are in significant part peculiar to
late-twentieth century America.”14 Tribe asserts that these dichotomies are not “inevitable
outgrowths of the natural order of things,” but rather “socially constructed,” an assertion the
early history of abortion law in America appear to support.15 In eighteenth and nineteenth
century American society, abortions were generally sought by single women in order to conceal
the sexual encounters that resulted in the pregnancy. But as Tribe argues, abortion was not seen

12

Hull and Hoffer, 90.
Andrea Tone, Devices and Desires: A History of Contraceptives in America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001) and
Elaine Tyler May, America and the Pill: A History of Promise, Peril, and Liberation (New York: Basic Books, 2011).
14
Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 27.
15
Ibid.
13
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as a moral concern. Instead, abortion was only discussed in relation to the illicit sexual behavior
that enabled it.16
The actual regulating of abortion by law did not begin in the United States until the
nineteenth century, and those early laws were meant to address women’s health. The first law,
passed by the state of Connecticut in 1821, prohibited only the inducement of abortion through
usage of dangerous poisons. In addition, this law only applied to postquickening abortion, which
illustrates early support for the idea that a woman should be able to end an unwanted pregnancy
in the earlier stages. By 1840, only eight states had enacted a statute restricting abortion.
However, between 1800 and 1900, the rate women were having children and the number they
had dropped by almost 50 percent, from 7.04 to 3.56 children, which Tribe argues, increased the
visibility of abortion.17 Advertisements ran in popular newspapers and magazines, promoting
home abortifacients, and the rate of abortion increased.
When restrictive abortion laws were passed in the United States in the mid-nineteenth
century, the organized medical profession was the proponent behind them. Physicians’
motivations ranged from concerns regarding the safety of abortion to the need to police the
boundaries of who could perform an abortion. With the rise in alternative practitioners
attempting abortions, physicians were eager to halt these self-proclaimed abortionists and
legitimize their own practices more.18 In 1857, Dr. Horatio Storer launched a national campaign
by the American Medical Association (AMA) to end legal abortion, and eventually, the
physicians organized a media and lobbying campaign that focused on the fetus’s right to life,
successfully reshaping attitudes toward abortion in the United States. Interestingly, the Roman

16

Ibid., 29.
Ibid.
18
James Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900 (Oxford: Oxford
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Catholic Church and the religious press did not address abortion until after the Civil War. While
religious opposition did grow in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was the clergy who
were influenced by the medical profession’s lobbying, not the other way around.19 By 1860, the
birthrate among white Americans of British and northern European descent had decreased
significantly when compared to that of new immigrant groups. Doctors used the changing
demographics to rouse Protestant middle and upper class fears of “race suicide” regarding the
ethnic makeup of the United States. Historian James Mohr asserts that opposition to abortion by
Protestant clergy was motivated more by fears of “racial suicide” than by morality concerns.20
In addition, evidence suggests that the physicians’ campaign for abortion regulation was
also motivated by the belief that abortion posed a threat to traditional sex roles. Allowing
women reproductive control enabled them to pursue opportunities beyond those traditionally
designated for women, and an 1871 report by the AMA’s Committee on Criminal Abortion
reflects these patriarchal concerns. The AMA described women seeking abortions as “unmindful
of the course marked out for her by Providence” and painted them as selfish and immoral. The
report illustrates the inability of these male physicians to separate female sexuality from the
traditional roles of wife and mother:
She yields to the pleasures—but shrinks from the pains and responsibilities of maternity.
… Let not the husband of such a wife flatter himself that he possesses her affection. Nor
can she in turn ever merit even the respect of a virtuous husband. She sinks into old age
like a withered tree, stripped of its foliage; with the stain of blood upon her soul, she dies
without the hand of affection to smooth her pillow.21
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the nineteenth century physician led campaign altered public opinion on
abortion, and within less than two decades, over forty anti-abortion statutes had passed in the
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United States. These laws abandoned the language of quick and nonquick fetuses, replacing this
language with exceptions for “therapeutic” abortion. Such abortions would be allowed when
deemed necessary by a physician to preserve a woman’s life. While regular physicians
successfully took control of the practice of abortion, the laws also reflected a significant change
in the role of the medical profession by making abortion a “matter of medical judgment.”22
With new antiabortion laws in place, there was little debate, however. This, Tribe
suggests, was because women continued to have abortions in roughly the same proportion as
they had before it was criminalized. They were not prevented from obtaining an abortion when
they desired one, so no pushback materialized against the restrictive statutes. Most statutes
remained the same throughout the United States from their adoption in the 1880s, and all made
exceptions for therapeutic abortions necessary to save the mother’s life. However as Rickie
Solinger notes in Beggars and Choosers, “Because the laws governing abortion did not precisely
define what was criminal and what was not, this had to be worked out in practice, in policing,
and in the courts. The complexity of defining ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ abortions for medical
practitioners and legal authorities alike, the gray and ever shifting nature of ‘criminality,’” was
an important distinction.23 Similarly, the medical understanding of therapeutic abortions was
also not reliable. Solinger says, “Physicians disagreed on the conditions that mandated a
therapeutic abortion and on the methods: there was no consensus.”24 The result was a stalemate
between the medical and legal communities, each looking to the other to define the legality of
abortion practices. By the 1930s, therapeutic abortions became increasingly important, and the
scope of the therapeutic abortion continued to evolve. In the 1930s, poverty became a widely
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accepted reason for therapeutic abortion. In the 1940s and 50s, psychiatric reasons became
acceptable.25
The modern era of debate on abortion, according to Tribe, began in the 1950s. As
medical care advanced for women with life-threatening pregnancies, doctors found it harder to
justify abortions for these women. The availability of “legal” abortions shrank as a result, and
scrutiny increased for those making medical abortion decisions. Hospitals established review
boards to decide in which cases abortions were “necessary.” As the number of therapeutic
abortions declined, doctors began asking for clarification of the laws. First, doctors were
concerned about potential lawsuits over varying interpretations of the “preservation of the
woman’s life” language in states’ abortion statutes. Second, doctors felt that hospital review
boards were arbitrarily limiting the number of therapeutic abortions, preventing them from acting
in their patient’s best interest.26
The American Law Institute (ALI), an influential body of legal academics and practicing
lawyers, suggested in 1959 a revision of its widely adopted Model Penal Code. This version
allowed for three defenses for a charge of criminal abortion: first, that continuation of the
pregnancy “would gravely impair the physical and mental health of the mother”; second, that the
child was likely to be born with “grave physical or mental defects”; and third, that the pregnancy
resulted from rape or incest.27 This Model Code required certification by two doctors confirming
justification for the abortion. By the 1960s, however, doctors began to focus on comparisons of
the danger of carrying a pregnancy to term with having an abortion. Where in 1955, one
hundred out of every one hundred thousand abortions resulted in death, by 1972, that number

25

Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, 35.
Ibid., 36.
27
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, (Philadelphia, PA: Executive Office, American Law Institute, 1962).
26

18

had fallen to three out of a hundred thousand.28 Coupled with a widening definition of what
“health” meant to physicians, doctors also began to consider the child’s quality of life. The lack
of therapeutic abortions nationwide spurred the feminist campaigns for the reform and repeal of
criminal abortion laws.29
Georgia was no exception to calls for reform and in 1968, the state legislature passed its
own liberalized abortion law modeled after the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code.
Effective on July 1, 1969, this new law specified that “anyone who uses any means upon any
woman with the intent to produce a miscarriage or abortion, commits criminal abortion.”30 The
penalty for conviction of criminal abortion under this new law ranged from imprisonment from
one to ten years. Additionally, the new Georgia law allowed for a misdemeanor penalty to be
applied if deemed appropriate. Most significantly, however, the law allowed for legal abortions
under specific circumstances. Under the liberalized Georgia abortion statute, five requirements
had to be satisfied, many requiring significant financial resources. First, a doctor, licensed to
practice in Georgia, must decide the abortion was necessary and determine if the pregnancy met
one of the following conditions: 1) Continuing the pregnancy would endanger the life of the
pregnant woman or would seriously and permanently injure her health; 2) the fetus was likely to
be born with serious permanent physical or mental defects; 3) the pregnancy was the result of
rape. In addition, the woman requesting the abortion had to certify in writing and under oath that
she was a legal resident of Georgia; the doctor performing the abortion had to also certify he
believed the woman to be a legal resident of Georgia, two other state licensed doctors had to
certify that the abortion is necessary, and finally, the abortion must be performed in a state
28
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licensed hospital. The hospitalization requirement severely limited rural Georgia women’s
access to legal abortion care. In 1971, 105 of Georgia’s 159 counties had no accredited hospital.
As a result, women who were dependent upon their county hospital for free medical services
were denied reasonable access to a safe, legal, therapeutic abortion.31
2.2

Inequality of Abortion Services

Figure 2.1 Feminist Abortion Postcard32
31
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In her eye-opening 1969 study, The Search for an Abortionist, Nancy Howell Lee shed
light on “one of the most common forms of illegal activity practiced in the United States,”
abortion.33 Lee spoke with 114 women living in New York, Massachusetts, California,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington, D.C.
While Lee acknowledges the limitations of her study due to the illegality of abortion, she does
attempt understand the experiences of a few of the women who obtained deliberate abortions
during this period. During the 1960s, the number of women obtaining abortions was estimated
to be one million per year, with only ten thousand successfully getting the procedure performed
legally in a hospital.34 And while Lee’s sample population was small and limited due to its
voluntary nature, she managed to speak with a number of women who undermined the popular
belief that most women seeking abortions were unmarried and hoping to escape illegitimacy.
Instead, contemporary studies at the time suggested that while the abortion rate was higher for
unmarried women, married women, particularly those who had all the children they choose to
have, were obtaining the majority of abortions.35
Of interest to Lee, however, is how women, who were law-abiding, respectable citizens,
managed to arrange illegal abortions during this period. For all women seeking an abortion,
there is a time limit on their search for an abortionist. Because most women were already five to
six weeks along before confirming their pregnancies and the majority of abortionists refused to
accept cases that were twelve or more weeks along, those seeking an abortion usually had fewer
than six weeks to decide what they wanted to do, locate an abortionist, make financial
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arrangements and have the procedure.36 Taking all this into account, Lee notes, “It is surprising,
on one level, that such a large number of people are willing to undertake the risks of an illegal
abortion rather than carry out the pregnancy. [Yet] it is even more surprising, when one thinks
about it, that hundreds of thousands of times each year people manage this complicated
procedure, in the absence of institutional facilities to help them (emphasis added).”37 The fact is
that abortions took place in the United States almost invisibly. People would know of someone
who had one; physicians knew of more cases; but public attention only came about when a
woman was taken to the hospital or died.
Lee details the experiences of 114 women, who voluntarily shared their experiences,
beginning with how each one found out about her pregnancy, found an abortionist, and the
procedure. Many women experienced dead-ends, obtaining information of one abortionist, only
to find that he was gone or no longer performing the procedure. In one account a newly married
woman fails to find an abortionist and suffers serious consequences:
When her friend was unable to reach the illegal abortionist she knew of, and the
pregnancy was advanced beyond the three-month time limit that most illegal abortionists
insist upon, this woman went to a third legitimate doctor recommended by a friend of a
friend. This doctor according to the informant, was “extremely sympathetic to my plight.
He advised me on the catheter system”…This advice was given when the pregnancy was
four months along. She used the catheter method to start an abortion, only to be taken to
a private hospital where they managed to “save” the pregnancy and discharged her. Two
weeks later she tried again and dislodged the pregnancy completely. The bleeding was so
profuse that her husband again called an ambulance to take her to the hospital for five
days, where she was questioned by police and hospital authorities on suspicion of
deliberate abortion, but no charges were brought. She felt she was extremely badly
treated, especially by the nurses at the hospital.38
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Other women were exploited financially. In Lee’s study, multiple women reported receiving
unskilled abortions after trying to find and paying for what they were misled to believe would be
the best care possible. A nineteen-year-old woman, with the help of her mother:
located a source for an expensive, supposedly highly qualified, doctor. The girl was
picked up on a street corner following telephone arrangements, and paid $650 to the
driver of the car, who took her to an expensive motel outside of town. Inside, she was
blindfolded, and a man came in who was addressed as “Doctor” by the driver of the car.
He inserted a catheter, and the two men left the girl alone. She phoned her mother to
come there and stay with her while the abortion was completed. When the abortion had
not been completed naturally by the next day, the mother took the girl to a local hospital
where a D. and C. was performed at a cost of $250. With the best of intentions and
considerable sophistication about how competent abortions are arranged, they ended up
paying $900 for a particularly dangerous and frightening experience.39
Today, this would have cost them over $6,500. In Lee’s sample, forty-eight couples borrowed
money to cover the costs of the abortion. Twelve borrowed from a bank or loan company,
providing a fake reason for the loan. The other thirty-six borrowed from family or friends, where
thirty were told the true reason for the loan.40
Distance proved to be another obstacle for Lee’s subjects. Less than one third of Lee’s
subjects had the abortion done in the area where they were living. The majority traveled by car,
bus, airplane, or train to have the procedure performed.41 In New York State, a study was
conducted on the relationship between distance and abortion utilization in 1970 and 1971, prior
to Roe and Doe. The study found that the greater distance women had to travel, the lower the
utilization of New York’s abortion facilities.42 Four years later, researchers in Georgia replicated
the study to see if the decisions in Roe and Doe had led to increased abortion utilization. Their
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results illustrated the negative impact of distance on abortion utilization, highlighting its
detrimental effect on young black women:
The effect of distance is particularly strong for black teenagers, but the correlation is
somewhat lower for white teenagers. One possible explanation is that white teenagers may
be thought of as being composed of two groups. The group of older, more affluent, more
well-informed teenagers (such as most of the college students) may have relatively little
difficulty in traveling considerable distances to obtain abortions. Some in fact may prefer
to travel to maintain anonymity. For younger, less affluent, less well-informed teenagers,
the effect of distance may be much more important…The time, money and effort needed to
travel may not be the only impediment to utilization of a distant abortion facility. A
woman who wants an abortion may simply not know of the existence or the availability of
an abortion provider outside her community. Operationally, however, the effect is
probably the same. A woman who lives farther away from abortion facilities will be less
likely to obtain an abortion.43
Underlying their assessment was the understanding that women who are the intersection of
inequalities, such as race and class, are at a loss when it comes to abortion utilization. Their lack
of knowledge, money, and time, made them vulnerable to a system that allowed for unequal
access to help. By limiting availability in rural counties, especially, these women faced an uphill
battle in gaining access to abortion services in Georgia.
2.3

The Search for an Abortionist
Prior to Georgia’s adoption of the liberalized abortion law, all abortions except those

approved for therapeutic reasons were considered “criminal.” As a result, abortions became
harder to obtain, more expensive, and more dangerous. With no legal alternatives, women not
wishing to be pregnant were forced to see back-alley abortionists or “plumbers.” Under these
conditions, Solinger notes that “a discretionary and discriminatory system developed in which
race and class privilege came to the forefront.”44 The few that could afford the timely process to
obtain a safe, legal, therapeutic abortion were usually white women with private health
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insurance. However, it should also be noted that this was not an easy process for these women
either. Inequality was rampant for both legal and illegal abortions. Although, arguably, lowincome and minority women suffered more from illegal abortions than wealthier white women.

Figure 2.2 Staged photo of woman entering an illegal abortion facility, Atlanta, GA, 196745

In an article published March 1966 in the Atlanta Journal, Eugene Moore illuminated the
plight of these women at Grady Memorial Hospital.46 Opening with the story of nineteen year
old “Z,” who arrived at the hospital in the middle of the night, she was crying and alone. After a
preliminary exam, doctors managed to stop the bleeding and prepare her for surgery. “Criminal
abortion,” explained the doctor, who proceeded to phone the police. Pressed for details
45
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regarding the procedure, “Z” stated she would rather not talk about it to detectives, and instead,
begged the doctors, “Just make me stop hurting.” Respecting her wishes the doctor asked the
detective to come back later. But that was too late. “Z” died while “surgeons battled to undo
what had been savagely done to her body.” A wire coat hanger had been inserted and punctured
her uterus, ripping the abdominal cavity. “Z” was the victim of one of the one million plus
estimated criminal abortions in the United States that year. In 1966, Grady Memorial Hospital in
Atlanta, Georgia, a public hospital that served 80 percent low-income patients, many of whom
were African American, reported that an estimated 250 women a year came in for treatment for
infection or bodily damage resulting from criminal or self-induced abortions.47
Two years later, in November 1968, Dr. John Asher and those in the CDC’s
Epidemiology Program’s Family Planning Evaluation Division were tasked with studying the
state of abortion, beginning with the collection of data regarding who was having abortions or
coming in because of non-hospital induced abortions at Grady Memorial Hospital. Grady served
as the pilot hospital for the Abortion Reporting Service under the CDC, a program that would
eventually expand on a national scale. From November 1968 to October 1969, the total abortion
population at Grady Memorial Hospital was 782 abortion patients. In the same time period,
there were 6,181 live deliveries, with 608 abortions for black women and 174 for white
women.48
Dr. Asher found that of the sixty non-hospital induced abortions treated at Grady, twentyfive percent of them were self-induced, a measure “always available to a desperate woman.”49
The one death among these women was an eighteen year old black honor student, in college, and
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engaged to be married. Among the hospital induced abortions, there were no deaths. One of the
few anomalies of Asher’s study, the number of white patients treated for hospital-induced
abortions exceeded black hospital-induced patients, a surprising factor given the general
population Grady serves. Asher attributed this to privileged white women seeking care at Grady
because their regular private physicians were unwilling to provide induced abortion care, “the
patient’s desire for anonymity, and the emergent nature of the situation.”50 Of the new Grady
patients, over 40% came from wealthier socio-economic areas of Atlanta, whereas only 8% of
the old Grady patients resided in such neighborhoods. In his conclusion, Asher argues that in
order to completely eliminate non-hospital abortion morbidity and mortality, acceptable
alternatives to continuing a pregnancy must be available to pregnant women. Specifically,
“hospital abortion care in a simple dignified manner to all segments of our population is the key
to eradicating death and disease secondary to non-hospital induced abortion in this country”
(emphasis added).51
The economic means of patients seeking safe, hospital-induced abortions created a
significant barrier for many women, a condition greatly impacted by the gender of the patient.
Similarly, it is the same economic considerations that prevented women of color, young women,
and rural women from affording a legal abortion in Georgia. In Nancy Howell Lee’s 1969 study,
The Search for an Abortionist, she found that less than a third of women in her sample felt they
had the luxury to choose an abortionist for reasons like competence or because the practitioner
was recommended. Ultimately, women were not in a position to compare alternatives and
choose the safest option, and the most logical option—a doctor—was out of the question. One
woman told Lee, “I never even tried to find a doctor to help me. I was too afraid that the doctor
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would turn me into the police.”52 Even more troubling, Lee found that a quarter of the women
who suffered complications from their back alley abortion did not seek or receive competent
medical care because they “feared prosecution from a physician or hospital.”53 Under the law,
the medical community was seen as the enemy, a dangerous reality for women in the United
States and Georgia.
Under such restrictive abortion laws, women were forced to enter an “underworld,”
where danger was always a potential, especially for those who were financially vulnerable.
Nancy Howell Lee calculated the average cost of an abortion in the late 1960s to be around $300
(equivalent to over $3,000 today), and some procedures could cost as much as $1,000 or more.54
With travel, the cost was even greater. Researchers James D. Shelton, Edward A. Brann, and
Kenneth F. Schulz found for women in Georgia specifically that the farther a woman must travel
to obtain an abortion the less likely she is to obtain one. Additionally, the effect is even greater
for black teenagers. They found that despite increased accessibility to abortion facilities
compared to the early 1970s, the farther a woman was from Atlanta, the less likely she was to
obtain a legal abortion. 55 Together, time, money and effort create a powerful impediment to
obtaining a safe, legal abortion.
In March 1971, a second study of abortion in Georgia was published, which provided an
even broader examination of how the new liberalized abortion law affected women throughout
the state. Beginning with a brief overview of the Georgia abortion law, the authors note that
“One might have expected hospital abortions to become as readily available in Georgia as in
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other states with similar laws.”56 Examining nonhospital abortion trends for 1950-1969 and
hospital abortion data for April 1968 to June 1970, the researchers found that such expectations
regarding the abortion law were not fulfilled during the first two years after its passage.
Throughout, researcher Roger Rochat and his team at the CDC’s study kept noticing a disturbing
trend. Between 1950 and 1969, nonhospital abortions resulted in the deaths of 205 residents in
55 of Georgia’s 159 counties. While abortion mortality declined 67 percent for whites and
blacks combined, abortion mortality declined 86 percent for white women and 46 percent for
black women between the first and the last five year periods of the 20 years being studied. Of
the 205 nonhospital abortion deaths, 69 percent were black women, and from 1964-1969, 88
percent of the abortion deaths were black women.57 Rochat and his team noted that “[a]bortion
mortality from nonhospital abortions in Georgia is becoming increasingly a black health
problem,” adding that “presumably, this reflects the lower socio-economic status of blacks in
Georgia.”58 This was further complicated when age in brought in to consideration. Researchers
found that pregnant black teenagers were 11 times more likely to die from nonhospital abortions
than pregnant white teenagers.59 While this law affected all women, when gender intersected
with race and class, the results were devastating. Margie Pitts Hames, the attorney for Doe in
Doe v. Bolton, recognized this, and while her arguments did not specifically address the concerns
of race, she would address the question of class, discussing the availability of services and the
cost to obtain a legal abortion in Georgia. While it was not explicit, the race of women
struggling to obtain a legal abortion was implicit in her discussion of class and the mortality rate
of nonhospital abortions.
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This same inequality extended to hospital abortion services. Dr. Rochat and his team
found that from April 12, 1968 to June 30, 1970, only 461 women obtained legal hospital
abortions. Of those, the black abortion ratio was less than one-third that of white women. While
discussing their findings, Rochat and his team concluded that “deaths due to nonhospital abortion
have been reduced to essentially zero for white women [which] indicates that abortion mortality
can be eliminated in Georgia.”60 Such a decline indicated that the same could be achieved for
black women in Georgia. Rochat and his fellow researchers concluded that “mortality from
nonhospital abortions for unmarried black women in Georgia will be reduced only if
contraceptive, abortion, and other maternal health services are provided more equitably to all
women in need of such services.”61 Rochat and those in the epidemiology team at the CDC
understood that gender played a role in the socio-economic status of women that directly
impacted the kind of medical care they could afford to receive when seeking an abortion.
“Doctors of conscience” like Dr. Jane Hodgson summed up the alarming truth: “In obtaining a
legal abortion, to use the old cliché, it is not what you know but who you know that matters . . .
[C]ompetent doctors make their services discreetly available to their middle class patients, and
the informal networks circulate this information among people similar in background, while poor
women find only non-physicians or self-induced methods available to them.”62
2.4

Georgia Second Wave Feminists Respond
Within the women’s liberation movement, reproductive control was regarded as

fundamental to women’s freedom. Underscoring the decision whether to have an abortion was
the idea that women have an active choice about their lives. In the 1960s, others in addition to
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the women’s liberation movement were working to change abortion laws like those in Texas and
Georgia. Organizations like the Association for the Study of Abortion in New York, population
control groups like ZPG (Zero Population Growth), and NARAL, then, The National Association
for Repeal of Abortion Laws, supported legislative change and challenged the constitutionality
of restrictive abortion laws. Meanwhile, women like Judith Rooks and women’s liberation
groups organized speak-outs, where women shared their experiences with illegal abortions.
Marches, demonstrations all illustrated their efforts to bring abortion out of the closet where it
had been shrouded in secrecy and shame. For feminists, the issue of abortion moved beyond the
language of privacy in sexual relations in the legal arena or the neutral language of choice. They
framed abortion in terms of “a woman’s freedom to determine her own destiny as she defined it,
not as others defined it.”63
The legal historian Laurence Tribe suggests that two widely reported tragic episodes
during the 1950s and early 1960s helped change medical opinion of abortion. The first stemmed
from the use of the tranquilizer thalidomide. While it was banned in the United States, it
continued to be marketed in Europe. The medication caused horrible birth defects when taken by
pregnant women. As a result pregnant women in Europe gave birth to badly deformed children;
“[i]nfants were born with seallike flippers instead of arms or with shortened thighs and twisted
legs. Others were missing ears or had paralyzed faces.”64 In 1962, an American woman, Sherri
Finkbine, discovered early in her fifth pregnancy that she had unknowingly taken a tranquilizer
that had been thalidomide. Advised by her physician, Finkbine scheduled a legal abortion at a
local hospital. Hoping to alert other women, she contacted a friend at a newspaper. The story
ended up on front pages across the country, creating enough controversy for the hospital to back
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out before the procedure was performed. No physician had said Finkbine’s own health was at
risk, yet some contended it was too easy for her to obtain permission for the legal abortion.
Unable to get an abortion legally, even after challenging the decision in the courts, Finkbine
traveled to Sweden for the abortion. Tribe argues that “the Finkbine case left in its wake a
controversy in the medical community over the proper reach of the exceptions physicians were
morally and legally allowed to make under the criminal abortion laws.”65
The second episode Tribe cites is the rubella, or German measles, outbreak of 1962-65.
Contracting rubella during pregnancy caused severe birth defects as well. When contracted early
in the pregnancy, rubella could cause blindness, deafness, and severe mental disabilities in the
child. Because of the outbreak, an estimated fifteen thousand children were born with birth
defects.66 Doctors, already reconsidering the changing medical realities, were moved to action
due to these two tragedies. Now, medical professionals, who were behind the restrictive abortion
laws of the nineteenth century, mobilized in favor of less restrictive abortion laws. Many cited
the belief that abortion could be less tragic than childbirth. In addition, physicians now feared
legal liability, when attempting to act in their patients’ best interest. It did not take long either
for such a case to materialize. In 1970, a Minnesota Physician, Dr. Jane Hodgson, was convicted
for performing an abortion on a twenty-three year old mother who had contracted German
measles. Hers was the first conviction of a physician performing an abortion in American
history, and was later reversed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe and Doe.67
During the outbreak, an Atlanta woman, daughter-in-law of the founder of Atlanta’s
Planned Parenthood chapter, Judith Taylor, saw firsthand the difficult realities of abortion under
the restrictive laws. Pregnant with her own child, Taylor had the good fortune of having
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contracted German measles as a child. However, Taylor had hired a young Puerto Rican woman,
who not too long after she started working, found out she was pregnant. Unmarried, the woman
confided to Taylor that she had contracted German measles at the last home she had worked in.
Taylor insisted the young woman have an abortion for the sake of the child, and turned to her
personal doctor, at Piedmont Hospital. Concerned that he had performed too many, he declined
Taylor’s request for help. Many physicians believed that they were being watched for a pattern
of performing too many abortions, and during the German measles epidemic, doctors were
performing more than they would have preferred. While he refused to perform the abortion
himself, he referred Taylor and the young woman to a younger doctor, who he believed had not
performed “too many” abortions yet. While the doctor did not make any promises, he did take
the woman’s case before the hospital committee for permission to perform the procedure. The
committee, Taylor states, took the position that there was only a 70 percent or 60 percent chance
that anything would be wrong with the baby. In response, the young doctor argued that if it's
your baby and there's something wrong with it, it's 100 percent. The committee denied her
request.68
In Atlanta, women like Judith Taylor were horrified with how little impact Georgia’s
liberalized abortion statute had on the ability for women to obtain safe, legal, therapeutic
abortions. In 1970, the Georgia Women’s Abortion Coalition hosted a public tribunal on
abortion. During the tribunal, fifteen women shared their stories with a crowd of 100 men and
women, testifying for more than three hours. In “near whispers,” these women shared the
gruesome details of their experiences. Their goal was to promote free and safe abortions and
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access to contraception. One woman’s story illustrates that the sexism and control exerted over
young women in the name of the traditional family:
At 19 I found out I was pregnant. In my mind the only solution was to get married
because all my life I had been taught abortion was murder. Three years later and two
children and one miscarriage later, I got pregnant again, even though I was taking the
Pill. I begged my doctor for an abortion. He told me to “settle down and have the baby.” I
had the baby and I began to search for a doctor who would perform a sterilization. One
after another, they told me I was too young, “What if all your children were killed in an
automobile accident?” they kept saying. What they were really saying was that I was not
capable of making this decision for myself.69
Across the state, virtually all hospitals that performed therapeutic abortions under the
1968 Georgia law, like Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta, imposed a firm, unspoken monthly
quota on the number of abortions—six in the case of Grady—that would be approved each
month, regardless of applicants’ individual situation.70 In response, groups like the Georgia
Citizens for Hospital Abortion were created, whose goals were to reform or repeal that law and
help women obtain safe, legal abortions in the meantime. For activist Judith Rooks, the
legalization of abortion in Washington D.C. and New York proved to be a crucial step forward in
the efforts to help women. Concurrently, activists like Rooks began preparing for their own legal
challenge to the state’s abortion law, what would later become Doe v. Bolton.
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Chapter 2: Doe v. Bolton and the Courts

While initial support for repeal came from doctors, clergy, and public health advocates,
the repeal initiatives also garnered support as well from the broader and more powerful feminist
movement on the 1960s and 70s. For feminists, access to abortion was central to the underlying
philosophy of the movement. When examining the history of this issue, it is helpful to have an
understanding of the politics at work. Kate Millet’s Sexual Politics provides a framework that
facilitates this understanding. Although it seems contradictory, it is necessary to jump from a
place where sex is seen as private act to something broaderpolitics. Although these people
argued for a right to privacy in court, their status in society is politicized regardless, and their
position in the power-structured relationshipsas the dominatedis important when attempting
to understand why they must fight at all.
Kate Millett, an American feminist, earned her bachelors degree in English literature
from the University of Minnesota, and attended Oxford University, becoming the first American
woman to finish with honors at Oxford’s St. Hilda’s. However, she is best known for her 1970
book Sexual Politics, which was first her doctoral dissertation at Columbia University.
Returning to the United States, Millet became involved in the Civil Rights Movement and
eventually, Millet joined the National Organization for Women in 1966, and later, New York
Radical Women, and Radicalesbians. Her book, Sexual Politics, served as one of many
manifestos for second wave feminism, expounding much of the theory driving feminism in the
1960s and 70s. Its success made her one of the many spokespersons of second wave feminism, a
position she was often uncomfortable with.1 Regardless, Millet’s Sexual Politics serves as an
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excellent source for the theory underlying the motivations of second wave feminists, including
those in Georgia. In Sexual Politics, Millet makes clear the connection between reproduction and
women’s rights.
Millet first asks readers, “Can the relationship between the sexes be viewed in a political
light at all?” For Millet, the simple answer is yes when defining politics as the “power-structured
relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another.”2
Ultimately, sex is a status category with political implications, and “politics” is used when
speaking of the sexes because it successfully outlines the true nature of their relative status,
historically and at the present. Within the fight for a right to reproductive control, the powerstructured relationships are those of men over women, whites over people of color. Millet notes
that because certain groups, notably women and people of color, have little or no representation
in various political structures, their positions as the dominated are stable and their oppression is
continuous.3 The legislation that denies these groups of people their right to reproductive control
is one example of their domination within such power-structured relationships. This is based on
the understanding that the legislators behind Georgia’s abortion reform bill were almost
exclusively white men with little stake in reproductive issues.
Feminist theorist, Ti-Grace Atkinson, regarded as the most radical of radical feminists, is
equally useful when discussing the relationship between sex politics and reproductive rights.
Atkinson was raised in an upper-class, Republican household in Louisiana. Married at the age of
seventeen, Atkinson moved to Philadelphia where she earned her B.F.A. from the University of
Pennsylvania. Divorced in 1961, Atkinson moved to New York in the mid-1960s and enrolled in

2
3

Millet, Sexual Politics, 23.
Ibid., 24.

36

Columbia University’s graduate program in political philosophy. Atkinson joined NOW in 1967
when she was twenty-eight years old. At the time she was a registered republican with no prior
political experience. However, like so many other feminists Atkinson had read Simone de
Beauvoir’s The Second Sex in 1962, and was deeply affected by it. She wrote to Beauvoir in
1965, who suggested Atkinson contact Betty Friedan. She did, and initially, Friedan saw
Atkinson as her protégé. Atkinson’s involvement in the New York NOW chapter put her in touch
with other radical feminists, Kate Millet, feminist playwright Anselma dell’Olio, and civil rights
attorney, Florynce Kennedy. Through NOW, Atkinson met women who radicalized her,
teaching her about other forms of oppression and putting her in touch with the “radical factions”
at Columbia University. According to Atkinson, “my feminism radicalized me on other issues,
not vice versa.”4 As a result of her radicalization, Atkinson became disillusioned with NOW and
left the group in October 1968, and eventually founded The Feminists in 1969. The group held
that sex roles were the root of the problem, specifically who conformed and who refused. In
order dismantle the system of male dominance, feminists would have to “annihilate” the sex-role
system.5
In her own theoretical writing, Ti-Grace Atkinson finds that women were the first
political class, defining political classes as “classes that are treated by other classes in some
special manner distinct from the way other classes are treated.”6 However, Atkinson makes one
distinction that Millet does notthat these “political” classes are artificial. Atkinson argues
“They define people with certain capacities by that capacity, changing the contingent to the
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necessary, thereby appropriating the capacity of an individual as a function of society.”7 By
doing such, these individuals are deprived of their human status, because as Atkinson points out,
a “function” of society cannot be a free individual. They cannot exercise “the minimum human
rights of physical integrity and freedom of movement.”8 In seizing control of their reproductive
abilities, women find themselves unable to exercise such rights, and as a result, they sued for
constitutional protection of their rights.
The sexual dominion in America remains one of the most pervasive ideologies, providing
the basis for power. Kate Millet argues this stems from our society’s grounding in patriarchy,
noting, “the military, industry, technology, universities, science, political office, and financein
short, every avenue of power within the society, including the coercive force of the police, is
entirely in male [heteronormative] hands.”9 The women suing for their right to safe, legal
abortions were ones removed from political power. With women only beginning to enter politics
at all levels in the 1960s, the authors of the abortion statutes were mostly men.
In addition to the significance of sex in politics, the marital status of women has a
number of significant implications for understanding Roe and Doe. First, marriage and by
extension, the family, play an important role in maintaining patriarchy’s oppression of women.
As Kate Millet discussed in Sexual Politics, the family acts as the chief institution of patriarchy,
arguing that it is “both a mirror of and a connection with the larger society; a patriarchal unit
within a patriarchal whole.”10 Serving as this agent, the family encourages its own members to
conform and “act as a unit in the government of the patriarchal state which rules its citizens
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through its family heads.”11 Is it a coincidence then that abortion is accused of attacking the
family unit? Millet argues that the family successfully controls and socializes people where
political and other authorities are not enough. In this sense, the family is a patriarchal tool for
conformity, and women seeking to control their own fertility, by seeking a hospital or nonhospital induced abortion challenge the notion of family. These women, for a variety of reasons,
wish to procreate as they see fit and operate outside of the traditional family structure, seen by
some as an attack on patriarchy and its unit of control. And as Millet argues, the fate of three
patriarchal institutions, the family, society, and the state are interrelated. If women have the
ability to control their own reproductive fates, these institutions and their power are directly
threatened.
Later, Millet asserts that patriarchy’s greatest weapon is its universality and longevity.
Having claimed support because of its basis in nature, it has been difficult for many to
undermine patriarchy’s existence. However, Millet notes, “when its workings are exposed and
questioned, it becomes not only subject to discussion, but even to change.”12 Second Wave
feminists’ battle for the right of women to control their reproduction does just that. All parties
questioned the workings of patriarchy, namely its hold over the family, and challenged it. For
them, the nature of women’s reproduction is a personal choice that should be free from
interference by the male heteronormative government, passing legislation restricting
reproductive freedom in a last ditch effort to save the family, patriarchy’s chief institution.
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Radical feminist Shulamith Firestone provides an equally useful work of theory, The
Dialectic of Sex. Just over five feet tall, Firestone was referred to within the movement as “the
firebrand” or “the fireball.”13 Firestone helped generate the essential discourse of radical
feminism, introducing the fundamental concepts of “the personal is political” and “the myth of
the vaginal orgasm.” In Dialectic of Sex, Millet reinterprets Marx, Engels, and Freud to
illuminate the pervasive nature of the sex class system, which she argues is deeper than any
economic or social divide.
Like Millet, Shulamith Firestone agrees that the discriminatory sex class system,
privileging men over women, can no longer be maintained on the grounds of its origins in nature,
arguing, “Humanity has begun to outgrow nature.”14 While men are capable of ending the sex
class system that has given them power over women and children, they have little incentive to do
so, making this a political problem. Sadly, while there may no longer be a relevant biological
basis for the current sex class system, it does not mean the oppression of women and children
will end. Feminists rightly worried that fertility control could be used against women to
reinforce the system of exploitation that exists. To prevent such an outcome, feminists argue
that women need to seize their own means of production. For feminists like Firestone, this
included the full restoration to women of ownership of their own bodies, but also their seizure of
control of human fertility—the new population biology as well as all the social institutions of
childbearing and childrearing. Hames’s fight on behalf of women in Georgia to gain such control

13

Susan Faludi, “Death of a Revolutionary,” The New Yorker, April 15, 2013.
Shulamith Firestone, “The Dialectic of Sex,” in Radical Feminism, ed. Barbara Crow (New York: New York
University Press, 2000), 94.
14

40

over their reproduction, challenges “the tyranny of the biological family,” uprooting the basic
15

social organization of patriarchal society.

Figure 3.1 Margie Pitts Hames, Atlanta, Georgia, June 21, 198916

3.1

The Making of Doe v. Bolton
Following repeated failed attempts to pass a 1970 repeal bill in Georgia, Judith Rooks

told the press in February 1970 that Georgia Citizens for Hospital Abortions (GCHA) would now
“strongly consider” turning to the courts to address the statute. At a panel session at the YWCA,
sponsored by the Atlanta chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW), the Georgia
Citizens for Hospital Abortions, and the Women’s Liberation Convention, Judith Rooks
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reiterated the critiques of Shulamith Firestone and Kate Millet, arguing that abortion laws like
Georgia’s are “kept alive by the puritan ethic—women have children and men make laws.”17
Ministers, doctors, and college professors joined Rooks and her fellow panelist Betty Mayo, an
associate of Emory’s family planning program and expressed concern that Georgia’s abortion
law gave preference to the affluent and that even illegal abortions are more easily obtained by
middle-class women that poor and minority women. Troubled by the medical red tape
surrounding therapeutic abortions, Betty Mayo cut to the chase: “Why should a woman have to
stand up in front of a psychiatrist all day to prove she’s crazy so she won’t have to have a
baby.”18
At the time, no one had challenged the 1967-68 reform laws in the courts, and Rooks
decided to put such a case together. Through her husband, Judith knew Agnes “Ruste” Kitfield,
the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union in Georgia. Rooks contacted
Kitfield for names of any attorneys who may be interested in such a case, and Kitfield put her in
touch with thirty-six year old Margie Pitts Hames. Born in Milton, Tennessee, Hames worked as
a legal secretary when she first started studying law at Middle Tennessee State University. She
transferred to Vanderbilt University, where she earned her bachelor’s and later, her law degree in
1961. In 1962, Hames and her husband moved to Atlanta, where she joined the firm Fisher and
Phillips. In 1968, she went on leave prior to the birth of her first child and had not returned.
When Kitfield approached Hames, her first question was quotidian: “She asked me would I be
interested in doing a women’s rights case.” Hames replied, “That would be fun.” At the time
Hames was nine months pregnant with her second child, so she cautioned Kitfield that she
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couldn’t do much for a while. Kitfield reassured her that all they needed was to plan at the
moment. With that reassurance, Hames happily agreed to help.19

Figure 3.2 Judith Rooks, Georgia feminist and activist20

In late February 1970, the first planning meeting for a Georgia abortion case took place at
Kitfield’s ACLU of Georgia office. Judith Rooks and Kitfield explained their goals to the three
women they assembled. In addition to Hames, Tobiane Schwartz, an attorney with Atlanta Legal
Aid, and Elizabeth Roediger Rindskopf, who worked at Emory Neighborhood Law Office,
joined Kitfield’s team. Each woman met two to three times with Taylor and Kitfield, with Betty
Kehrer from Georgia Legal Services, and private attorney Orinda Evans joining in at times as
well. As GCHA continued to be inundated with calls from women seeking assistance to obtain
abortions, the lawyers’ discussions turned towards identifying what kind of plaintiffs would be
best. They ultimately agreed a wide range of plaintiffs should be counted, including doctors,
nurses and clergy. Hames and Rooks took it upon themselves to make most of the calls. They
19
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enlisted doctors like Rooks’s husband, Peter Bourne, who oversaw a community health center
through Emory; Emory’s Dr. Robert A. Hatcher, a highly regarded expert on contraceptives, and
Emmett Herndon, a clergy counselor. However, all agreed that their lead plaintiff should be a
woman, and probably, an unwillingly pregnant woman who had unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain a legal abortion in Georgia. In early March, Judith Rooks used her connections at Grady
Memorial Hospital to ask two of the women responsible for interviewing and evaluating abortion
applicants, Sallie Craig Huber and Kit Young, to take note of any applicant who may be denied
an abortion due to Grady’s quota and be a strong candidate for a federal court challenge to the
1968 statute.21
Within two weeks, Kit Young interviewed a candidate who met the requirements.
Twenty-two year old Sandra Bensing was several weeks along in what was her fourth pregnancy.
Bensing was the daughter of an Atlanta sanitation employee and a mother who had her when she
was sixteen. Bensing dropped out of school in the ninth grade and married Joel Lee Bensing, a
drifter from Oklahoma, when she was seventeen. She gave birth to a son in May 1966, and a
daughter in May 1967. Both Joel and Sandra worked sporadically, and their marriage was
troubled from the start. Joel was arrested several times for attempting to abuse several different
children. In June 1968, Sandra’s mother attempted to have Sandra committed to the Central State
Hospital in Milledgeville, Georgia. Sandra left after a brief stay and returned to Joel. In May
1969, Sandra was seven months pregnant with her third child, and Joel left Georgia for
Oklahoma.
Sandra initiated divorce proceedings, citing Joel’s history of child abuse as her
motivation. The following month, however, Sandra joined Joel again in Texas, where she gave
birth to and gave up for adoption her third child. By Fall 1969, the Bensings returned to Georgia,
21
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and in early 1970, both of the older children were removed from their custody and placed in a
foster home. In March 1970, Sandra left Joel and moved in with her mother, only to realize she
was again pregnant. On March 12, Bensing went to Grady to begin the process of obtaining a
legal abortion. Four days later, she returned for a series of interviews with psychiatrist Dr.
Charles W. Butler and two psychologists. She informed them that she had renewed divorce
proceedings and would be unable to care for a new child if the pregnancy continued. She was
brought in again on March 24th and 28th for additional psychiatric consultations, and on April 1,
received an obstetrical exam. On April 10th, Dr. Butler informed Bensing that her application had
been denied.22
On April 13, 1970, Tobi, Judith and Margie Hames were put in touch with Bensing and
proceeded to finalize their draft complaint on Bensing’s behalf. On April 16, Bensing filed an
affidavit recounting her unsuccessful attempt to obtain a therapeutic abortion at Grady Hospital
and authorized the filing of a federal court challenge against the 1968 abortion statute on her
behalf. Agreeing to be designated publicly as “Mary Doe,” Sandra discussed in an affidavit how
all of her children were no longer in her custody, her prior stay at Central State Hospital, and her
inability to financially support and care for another child. That same day, Margie Hames and
Tobi Schwartz filed their complaint and Sandra’s sealed affidavit in federal district court for the
Northern District of Georgia. “Mary Doe” and Peter Bourne were the first two named in a list of
twenty-four people and two organizational plaintiffs.23 Eight more doctors, seven nurses, five
ministers, and two social workers rounded out the list of plaintiffs. Instead of naming Grady
Hospital as a defendant, however, Hames and Schwartz named Georgia’s Attorney General,
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Arthur Bolton, and asked for the appointment of a three-judge court to hear their request for both
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the 1968 abortion statute.24
By late April, Fifth Circuit Chief Judge John Brown named District Judges Sidney O.
Smith, Jr. and Albert J. Henderson, Jr., and Circuit Judge Lewis R. Morgan as Doe’s special
three-judge court. Around the same time, Dr. Peter Bourne and Dr. Donald L. Block, an
obstetrician/gynecologist at Georgia Baptist Hospital secured approval of Bensing’s abortion at
Georgia Baptist. Hames, Schwartz and the Bournes cobbled together the several hundred dollars
needed to pay for the abortion. Weeks later, the Bournes and Bensing’s attorneys received news
that Sandra had failed to show up for her scheduled abortion at Georgia Baptist and was nowhere
to be found. Quietly, they began to search for another candidate to substitute for Sandra for the
case. A week before the scheduled hearing on June 15th, Sandra contacted Margie Hames from
Oklahoma. Joel had taken her to Oklahoma and then abandoned her with no money. More
importantly, Sandra told Hames that she had felt the fetus move and was now convinced she did
not want an abortion anymore. Hames assured Sandra that no one would force her to have an
abortion, but asked that she return to Atlanta for the June 15th hearing. Using the money
originally intended for her abortion, they got a pre-paid plane ticket for Sandra to return to
Atlanta on June 14th.25
Heavily influenced by Roy Lucas’s legal arguments surrounding the right to privacy,
Hames, Schwartz and Rindskopf stated in their brief that “Griswold is not an isolated decision
confined to its facts, but one in a continuing line of decisions involving various aspects of
personal privacy and family autonomy.”26 They went on to argue that “the State has no
compelling interest to justify interfering with a women’s basic right to privacy in matters related
24
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to sex, family, and marriage,” and therefore, the 1968 Georgia reform statute “is an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy.”27
At the hearing, the three-judge court emphasized the questions of jurisdiction and merits
of the case and rejected the need for evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs. Hames, Schwartz, and
Rindskopf had prepared multiple witnesses for such testimony and were dismayed at the judges’
dismissal of such evidence. On July 31, 1970, however, the Atlanta court found the 1968 statute
unconstitutional. While they agreed that the state could not limit the grounds on which a woman
could obtain an abortion, the requirement that hospitals oversee each individual physician’s
decision with some sort of committee approval, like Georgia did, was found to be constitutional.
They agreed that a declaratory judgment should be issued, but they would not issue formal
injunctive relief prohibiting state enforcement of the 1968 statute:
While the Court agrees that the breadth of the right to privacy encompasses the decision
to terminate an unwanted pregnancy we are unwilling to declare that such a right reposes
unbounded in any one individual. Rather, we are of the view that although the state may
not unduly limit the reasons for which a woman seeks an abortion, it may legitimately
require that the decision to terminate her pregnancy be one reached only upon
consideration of more factors than the desires of the woman and her ability to find a
willing physician…
For whichever reason, the concept of personal liberty embodies a right to privacy which
apparently is also broad enough to include the decision to abort a pregnancy. Like the
decision to use contraceptive devices, the decision to terminate an unwanted pregnancy is
sheltered from state regulation which seeks broadly to limit the reasons for which an
abortion may be legally obtained. However, unlike the decision to use contraceptive
devices, the decision to abort a pregnancy affects other interests than those of the woman
alone, or even husband and wife alone.
Once conception takes place and an embryo forms, for better or for worse the woman
carries a life form with the potential of independent human existence. Without positing
the existence of a new being with its own identity and federal constitutional rights, we
hold that once the embryo has formed, the decision to abort its development cannot be
considered a purely private one affecting only husband and wife, man and woman.
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A potential human life together with the traditional interests in the health, welfare and
morals of its citizenry under the police power grant to the state a legitimate area of
control short of an invasion of the personal right of initial decision.28
In regards to the requirements over how women reach such a conclusion, the Georgia
panel that the current requirements of the reform statute were “reasonable and seemingly sound
inasmuch as medical practitioners are in the best position by virtue of training to judge
concurrently the basis as well as the risk inherent in such a decision.” The panel determined that
because of the weight of the decision to have an abortion it was reasonable of the state to require
women to consult with doctors to ensure the women were taking into consideration “all relevant
factors, whether the be emotional, economic, psychological, familial or physical.” Providing
further examples of “reasonable” required consultations, the panel suggested that “the legislature
might require any number of conditions such as consultation with a licensed minister or secular
guidance counselor as well as the concurrence of two licensed physicians or any system of
approval related to the quality and soundness of the decision in all its aspects.” The reasoning of
the Court for why it was acceptable for the state to require further consultation beyond a single
woman or the woman and her doctor? To protect against abortion mills. While a noble sentiment,
in practice, it restricted both the woman and her doctor from making medical decisions in a
timely fashion. Adding in the fact that the process women had to go through required time and
money, two things many women cited as reasons for seeking abortions, the reform statute
negatively impacted poor women and women of color the most. However, the Georgia panel
rejected this argument stating that “where abortions may be obtained only from licensed
physicians and surgeons, and only after psychiatric consultation, the mere fact that physicians
and psychiatrists are more accessible to rich people than to poor people, making abortions more
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available to the wealthy than to the indigent, is not in itself a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”29
White Hames was pleased with the court’s decision overall, she was dismayed that the
panel had upheld the hospital committee process. After some discussion, it was agreed they
would appeal the upholding of the hospital abortion committee review process. Due to the
Atlanta panel’s refusal to order injunctive relief, the plaintiffs had the opportunity for a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. At this point, it was decided that Margie, with the assistance of
regional ACLU attorney Reber Boult, would take charge of the Doe appeal.30
3.2

Oral Arguments and the Supreme Court
On April 22, 1971, the Supreme Court narrowly decided in private to hear both Roe v.

Wade and Doe v. Bolton, five-to-four. On May 3, the decision was formally announced that both
cases would be heard sometime in the fall. During the summer leading up to oral arguments,
Hames worked on the primary brief for Doe. However, she ended up spending significant
amounts of time trying to help address racial tensions in Columbus, Georgia. An ACLU intern,
Pam Walker, was assigned to assist Hames with the brief. Tobiane Schwartz had the
responsibility of handling Doe’s lead plaintiff, Sandra Bensing. Weeks after Bensing gave birth
to her baby “Doe,” her husband Joel kidnapped a six-year old girl, taking her from Atlanta to
Oklahoma. In January 1971, he pled guilty and immediately began serving a twenty-year prison
sentence. Tobi helped Sandra renew her efforts to divorce Joel, and by May 1971, the divorce
was finalized. Sandra moved in with her mother and stepfather, and by the end of the summer
remarried.31
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It was during this period that Hames began to look into research conducted by the CDC
on maternal mortality and morbidity with abortion. CDC researcher Roger Rochat worked on
one study that heavily influenced the briefs in Doe and Hames’s oral arguments. Rochat’s study
concluded that Georgia’s abortion reform statute was not making therapeutic abortions more
accessible, the intention of the reform. While Rochat and his colleagues were aware of the
necessity of such research for public health, the utilization of their study in Doe v. Bolton
illuminated a needed collaboration between the medical and legal community on behalf of
women:
And so what was important out of that wasn’t in a sense that I had done the study, but
that a lawyer, Margie Pitts Hames, took that data along with other CDC studies and other
information and appealed Georgia’s law to the Supreme Court and that led to the Doe v.
Bolton decision. So that’s…that was in a sense one of the most memorable events of my
professional career. I mean, a lot of other good things along the way too, but to have,
with a small amount of data, really been able to contribute to such a momentous decision
was just extraordinary.32

Four months after the Court announced it would hear Roe and Doe, in September 1971,
aging Justices Hugo L. Black and John M. Harlan announced their resignations back-to-back,
reducing the number of Justices hearing arguments from the usual nine to seven. Despite their
replacements, Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist, not having been seated yet, the Court
moved forward with oral arguments. In her first oral argument before the Supreme Court, Hames
was understandably nervous. Her argument went smoothly, and she focused on emphasizing the
cumbersome nature of Georgia’s requirements for obtaining a legal, hospital induced abortion,
specifically that the procedure must be performed in a state licensed hospital. Hames directed
most of her argument towards the shortcomings of the three-judge panel’s ruling, stating, “It is
32
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our contention that the procedural requirements left standing by the court below have virtually
manipulated out of existence the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.” Hames argued,
“The hospital licensing…requirement limits abortions in Georgia and then many rural women
access to abortion services. Of Georgia’s counties, 105 had no accredited hospital. So that those
women who were dependent upon their county hospital for free medical service are denied by
virtue of this hospital accreditation requirement.” Dorothy Beasley’s argument focused on “the
value which is to be placed on fetal life,” and addressed the question of Griswold head on: “A
person has a right to be let alone, certainly, but not when another person is involved, or another
human entity is involved.33
The Justices’ private, post- argument conference revealed a majority favored affirming
the lower court’s ruling against the Texas statute Roe challenged, but there was no consensus on
Doe.34 Chief Justice Warren Burger assigned the preparing of both decisions to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, who in early 1972, once Justices Rehnquist and Powell were seated, nominated both
Roe and Doe as candidates for possible rearguing. In May 1972, Blackmun circulated a brief
draft of his Roe opinion, which to the frustration of his colleagues, proposed that the Court hold
Texas’s anti-abortion law unconstitutional solely on the grounds that its only exception when
mother’s life was threatened was void for vagueness.35 Justices Brennan and Douglas
complained directly to Blackmun, and several days later, Blackmun circulated a more substantial
draft for Doe v. Bolton.36 In response to the Doe draft, Justice Byron R. White circulated a draft
of his dissent to Blackmun’s Roe opinion, arguing that holding Texas’s statute as
unconstitutionally vague would essentially override the Court’s thirteen month old holding in
33
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United States v. Vuitch 402 U.S. 62 (1971) that found the District of Columbia’s statute banning
abortions except when “necessary for preserving the mother’s life or health” was not
unconstitutionally vague.37 In his draft dissent, White argued that “[i]f a standard which refers to
the ‘health’ of the mother . . . is not impermissibly vague, a statutory standard which focuses
only on ‘saving the life’ of the mother would appear to be a fortiori acceptable.”38 Essentially,
White argued that if the Court held the “health” of the mother was not vague in Vuitch, the
standard in Roe for “saving the life” of the mother was essentially the same and therefore not
vague. The Court would be reversing its own opinion with such a finding.
Within forty-eight hours of White’s dissent circulating, Harry Blackmun sent a memo to
his colleagues:
Nearly all of you, other than Lewis Powell and Bill Rehnquist, have been in touch with
me about these cases. A number of helpful and valid suggestions have been made.
You will recall that when we were canvassing the list for possible candidates for
reargument when the bench would be full, I suggested that, although the Texas case
perhaps might come down, the Georgia case should go over. This suggestion was not
enthusiastically received. It was the consensus, as I recall, that I produce some drafts and
we would see what reactions ensued. I have done this and, frankly, I prepared the Texas
memorandum the way I did in the hope that we might come near to agreement there
irrespective of disposition of the Georgia case.
Although it would prove costly to me personally, in the light of energy and hours
expended, I have now concluded, somewhat reluctantly, that reargument in both cases at
an early date in the next term, would perhaps be advisable. I feel this way because:
1. I believe, on an issue so sensitive and so emotional as this one, the country deserves
the conclusion of a nine-man, not a seven-man court, whatever the ultimate decision
may be.
2. Although I have worked on these cases with some concentration, I am not yet certain
about all the details. Should we make the Georgia case the primary opinion and
recast Texas in this light? Should we refrain from emasculation of the Georgia statute
and, instead, hold it unconstitutional in its entirety and let the state legislature
reconstruct from the beginning? Should we spell out—although it would then
37
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necessarily be largely dictum—just what aspects are controllable by the State and to
what extent? [emphasis added]39
By the end of summer 1972, Blackmun’s two departing law clerks responsible for the
Roe and Doe decisions, were still contemplating making Doe the more constitutionally
significant decision over Roe. Clerk George Frampton wrote to Blackmun that the opinions
should give states “a comprehensive prescription” for how to amend their abortion statutes,
explaining how in Doe:
I have written in, essentially, a limitation of the [abortion] right depending on the time
during pregnancy when the abortion is proposed to be performed . . . I have chosen the
point of viability for the ‘turning point’ (when state interests become compelling) for
several reasons: a) it seems to be the line of most significance to the medical profession .
. . ; b) it has considerable analytic basis in terms of the state interest as I have articulated
it.40
On September 5, the Court notified counsel that Roe and Doe would be reargued on
October 11. In her oral reargument almost a year later, Hames took her argument a step further,
directly calling the Court’s attention to who Georgia’s statute oppresses:
I believe I’ve pointed out before in the prior argument that we have had some
23-- 25 cases now reported involving abortions in Georgia and many of those involved
nurses or contractors and, I believe, a plumber in one case, and you can find those kinds
of cases all over the United States, [a] woman placing their hands -- their life in the hands
of an unskilled abortionist. Therefore, we feel that the statute must be viewed in the
health context.1,579 women received abortions in Georgia in 1971 and 3,410 women -Georgia women went to New York for abortions…I give you these statistics to show that
41
there is still a considerable limitation on the availability of abortion services in Georgia.
By discussing women who could afford to fly to New York, Hames also illuminated the
plight of those who could not. These were the poor, rural or young women. Unable to afford the
39
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costly process under the Georgia law or the trip to New York for a safe, legal abortion, these
women took chances and visited a plumber, an illegal abortionist, or self-induced, which often
included the ingestion of poison.

Figure 3.3 Numbers of Women Traveling to New York State for Legal Abortions42

Later, Hames discussed another CDC study conducted at Grady Memorial Hospital,
which found that 54% of the applicants for abortion in compliance with the Georgia law were
forced to discontinue their applications altogether. Their alternatives were to go to New York if
they had money, but in reality, these women would not have been applying to the public hospital
in the first place if they had the resources. If they could not afford the trip to New York, their
options were to choose a $500-illegal abortion in Atlanta, give birth to the child and find
42
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adoptive parents, or rear the child. The same study further showed that by the end of the work up
period of all the paperwork that 56% of those applicants of that hospital had become second
trimester pregnancies, which meant the only option after that was the saline procedure, both
43

more time-consuming and costly.

Under this system, black women, poor women, rural women and the young suffered most
due to the costly nature of the procedure imposed by the state’s requirements. Hames
understood that the oppression of women was tied to their reproductive rights, and similarly, it
was the economic exploitation of women under patriarchy that would continue to prevent them
from seizing control of their own reproduction. Statistics from the Women’s Bureau of the U.S.
Department of Labor show that in 1967, the wage scale for white and non-white women were the
lowest of all. White men earned an average of $6,704, and non-white men earned $4,277. White
women, on the other hand, earned $3,991, and non-white women earned $2,861. In the end, the
manipulative use of black workers and women have been a severe handicap to ending the
oppression of women, feeding the vicious cycle that continued to prevent them from seizing
44

control of their reproduction.

Margie Pitts Hames recognized the oppressive nature of Georgia’s abortion law, choosing
to emphasize the time consuming and unnecessarily costly nature of the procedure in Georgia.
For her purposes, there was an undue burden being placed on women wishing to control their
reproductive abilities, but an even greater burden existed for women of color and the
economically disadvantaged. These women were already struggling under the patriarchal power
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structure, and most significantly, the economic inequality forced on women. In addition to these
inequalities, they found their opportunity to have a safe, legal abortion in Georgia made even
more difficult. The implications of such an imposition have profound consequences, specifically
for the preservation of patriarchy and the family. In order to end women’s oppression, it is
essential that women seize control of their reproduction, and by limiting access to safe abortions,
the majority male legislators in Georgia made such a task more difficult. Arguably, they
perceived abortion and universal reproductive rights for women as a threat to the family unit,
patriarchy’s chief institution for controlling women and indoctrinating children. Ultimately,
Hames’s case in Doe contributed to liberating the reproductive abilities of women in the United
States, allowing them to take a step forward toward ending their oppression under patriarchy.
Dorothy Beasley’s reargument attempted to flip the interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment, insisting that the fetus ought to have “the right to be let alone.” Justice Thurgood
Marshall responded “You can’t recognize the Ninth Amendment for the fetus and not recognize
the Ninth Amendment for the mother, can you?” Justice Blackmun pushed Beasley on why
Georgia’s statute did not include an incest exception, and in response, Beasley reiterated her
basic argument that Georgia’s interest was in protecting fetal life. 45
3.3

Justice Harry A. Blackmun and the Opinion
Days after the two rearguments, Blackmun still wanted to make Doe the lead opinion on

the Fourteenth Amendment privacy right question and strike the Texas statute in Roe for
vagueness, leaving Vuitch untouched. However, Lewis Powell expressed that health concerns,
not economic concerns, should be the primary explanation for the decisions. Therefore, Powell
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suggested that the Texas statute in Roe should be struck down on the basic constitutional
question of a right to privacy and Roe be the lead opinion. Powell’s comments led Blackmun to
concede that he would be open to bypassing vagueness in Roe and instead, decide both cases on
the same basic constitutional grounds.46
Five weeks later, Blackmun circulated heavily revised drafts for both Roe and Doe. In the
cover memo for these drafts, Blackmun stated “I have concluded that the end of the first
trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other point, such as quickening or viability,
is equally arbitrary.”47 In the new draft of Roe, Blackmun wrote that during the first trimester “[a
state] must do no more than to leave the abortion decision to the best medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.” However, for the second and third trimesters, “the State
may, if it chooses, determine a point beyond which it restricts legal abortions to state reasonable
therapeutic categories that are articulated with sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to
predict what conditions fall within the state classifications.”48 Later drafts refined the time test
further due to a December 12 letter from Justice Marshall. Marshall wrote the he believed that
the line drawn for state interests should be at viability rather than the end of the first trimester.
His rationale took into consideration the experience of women facing an unplanned pregnancy,
arguing “Given the difficulties which many women may have in believing that they are pregnant
and in deciding to seek an abortion, I fear that the earlier date may not in practice serve the
interests of those women, which your opinion does seek to serve.” Marshall wrote that his
concerns could be assuaged if “the opinion state explicitly that, between the end of the first
trimester and viability, state regulations directed at health and safety alone were permissible.”
46
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While Marshall accepted that at some point the state’s interest in protecting the potential life of
the fetus could override any individual interest of the women, he concluded that if that point was
before viability, as it was in Blackmun’s second draft, it would lead states to ban abortions
completely at any later date.49 Blackmun modified his definition of “viability” to satisfy
Marshall, but received his most significant critique in a December 14th letter from Justice Potter
Stewart:
One of my concerns with your opinion as presently written is the specificity of its
dictum—particularly in its fixing of the end of the first trimester as a the critical point for
valid state action. I appreciate the inevitability and wisdom of the dicta in the Court’s
opinion, but I wonder about the desirability of the dicta being quite so inflexibly
“legislative.”50
This criticism of the Court as acting more as a legislature than a court continues to be a common
one for Roe.
When the opinions were announce January 22, 1973, both Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
looked significantly different than the initial drafts Blackmun circulated in May 1971. After two
sessions of oral arguments and multiple drafts and memos between the Justices, Roe v. Wade was
the lead opinion, although Blackmun stated that the two opinions should be read alongside one
another. For while Roe invalidated the laws of the thirty states whose abortion statutes were
identical to the statute in Texas, the Doe opinion invalidated the Georgia law as well as the
similar reform laws adopted by fourteen states in the years after 1967. In the final opinion,
Blackmun held that both “Mary Doe” and the physician plaintiffs in the case had standing to
challenge Georgia’s abortion statute. While the law was not voided for vagueness, all of the
provisions that had been upheld by the lower court were unconstitutional, and the opinion went
on to nullify them one by one. In regards to the hospitalization requirement, Blackmun wrote
49
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“We feel compelled to agree with appellants that the State must show more than it has in order to
prove that only the full resources of a licensed hospital, rather than those of some other
appropriately licensed institution, satisfy these health interests [that the Court acknowledge in
Roe].”51 Addressing the hospital committee authorization required by the Georgia statute, the
Court held that “we see no constitutionally justifiable pertinence in the structure for the advance
approval by the abortion committee.”52 Finally, the opinion assessed the statute’s requirement
that two doctors validate any given physicians finding as unconstitutional. “Required
acquiescence by co-practitioners has no rational connection with a patient’s needs and unduly
infringes on the physician’s right to practice.”53
Three justices of the seven justice majority for Roe and Doe filed concurrences. Justice
William O. Douglas’s was the longest at thirteen pages, and further explored the constitutional
right to privacy. Douglas’s opinion aligns with Blackmun’s, acknowledging that there is no
mention of privacy in the Bill of Rights, but that earlier decisions have “recognized it as one of
the fundamental values those amendments were designed to protect.”54 While Douglas yielded
that the Ninth Amendment did not create federally enforceable rights, its reference to many other
unenumerated rights enjoyed by Americans included many that also fall under the meaning of
Fourteenth Amendment “liberty.” Douglas proceeds to outline in three parts what elements of
privacy fall under “liberty.”55
Douglas wrote that “First is the autonomous control over the development and expression
of one’s intellect, interests, tastes, and personality.”56 The First and Ninth Amendments protects
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these facets of the right of privacy. Second, was “freedom of choice in the basic decisions of
one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and
upbringing of children.”57 Earlier decisions Loving, Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Pierce all
dealt with these liberties and while they were subject to state control, any such regulation had to
be justified by a compelling state interest. In a footnote, Douglas denied that Griswold and other
decisions invoked “substantive due process,” insisting that was a bridge the Court opinion did
not cross. The third area “is the freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from
bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll of loaf.”58
Ultimately, Douglas concluded that “[t]he Georgia statute is at war with the clear
message of these cases -- that a woman is free to make the basic decision whether to bear an
unwanted child. Elaborate argument is hardly necessary to demonstrate that childbirth may
deprive a woman of her preferred lifestyle and force upon her a radically different and undesired
future.”59 He did acknowledge the state’s interest in both protecting the health of the woman and
the fetus after quickening, but quoted former Justice Tom Clark to address the question of when
that becomes valid:
To say that life is present at conception is to give recognition to the potential, rather than
the actual. The unfertilized egg has life, and if fertilized, it takes on human proportions.
But the law deals in reality, not obscurity -- the known, rather than the unknown. When
sperm meets egg, life may eventually form, but quite often it does not. The law does not
deal in speculation. The phenomenon of life takes time to develop, and, until it is actually
present, it cannot be destroyed. Its interruption prior to formation would hardly be
homicide, and as we have seen, society does not regard it as such. The rites of Baptism
are not performed and death certificates are not required when a miscarriage occurs. No
prosecutor has ever returned a murder indictment charging the taking of the life of a
fetus. This would not be the case if the fetus constituted human life.
In summary, the enactment is overbroad. It is not closely correlated to the aim of
preserving prenatal life. In fact, it permits its destruction in several cases, including
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pregnancies resulting from sex acts in which unmarried females are below the statutory
age of consent. At the same time, however, the measure broadly proscribes aborting other
pregnancies which may cause severe mental disorders. Additionally, the statute is
overbroad because it equates the value of embryonic life immediately after conception
with the worth of life immediately before birth.60
Douglas concludes, “The right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the physicianpatient relationship,” and that Georgia statute’s mandated approval process represented “a total
destruction of the right of privacy between physician and patient,” violating a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty.61
Joining Douglas’s concurrence were ones by Justice Potter Stewart and Chief Justice
Warren Burger. Burger’s was the shortest at only three paragraphs long, emphasizing that both
the Georgia and Texas statutes “impermissibly limit the performance of abortions necessary to
protect the health of pregnant women.”62 In addition, though, Burger added that he would be
“inclined to allow a State to require the certification of two physicians to support an abortion,”
insisting that “the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion on
demand.”63
In Georgia, reactions to the case were polarized. Unsurprisingly, Georgia’s attorney
general, Arthur K. Bolton, declined to comment until he had time to digest the entire opinion.
However, right to life groups were swift to comment in his place. Jay Bowman, chairman of the
900 member group, Georgia Right to Life, told the Atlanta Constitution, “We are shocked and
disappointed…It remind us of the 1857 Dred Scott decision which said that although he may
have a beating heart and a functioning brain, and be biologically human, the black man was not a
legal person…It required an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to give the black man his right
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to freedom and it may take a constitutional amendment to restore the unborn child’s right to
life.”64 Dorothy Beasley declined to ever record her reaction to the decision, but when the
Clerk’s Office at the Supreme Court, following its customary procedure sent collect telegrams to
the Roe and Doe attorneys, Western Union notified the Court’s Clerk that “Dorothy T Beasley
Asst Atty General of Georgia . . . declined to accept your message and charges.65 Hames on the
other hand told press she was “very pleased,” calling Doe “a very important decision because it
has given the woman’s right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy constitutional standing. It’s
now a constitutional right.” Calling it “one of the most important women’s rights cases,” Hames
added that “If a woman can control her reproductive life, then she is getting a very substantial
chunk of freedom.”66
Ultimately, both Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton helped legitimize the belief that a personal
reproductive decision made by a woman should be understood as an individual right. While
Justice Harry Blackmun did not rest the Court’s decision on women’s equality or the goal of
undermining patriarchy, he did recognize that the power women possessed to decide whether or
not to have a child could be viewed as a right.
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4

Chapter 3: Abortion in a Post-Doe World

Figure 4.1 Georgia demonstrators outside a meeting of the "Moral Majority," Omni Coliseum, Atlanta, GA,
October 11, 1980. 1

When New York’s legislature debated legalizing abortion in 1969 and 1970, radical
feminists passed out copies of their ideal abortion law—a blank sheet of paper. For them, repeal
was the goal and repeal meant no laws on abortion period. They argued that “any reform, no
matter how liberal, was a defeat since it maintained the State’s right to legislate control over
women’s bodies.”2 With the state’s control codified in any law regulating abortion, like the New
York statute that passed, feminists believed the door was now open to further restrictions. These
radical feminists could envision a time when abortion was legal, but inaccessible to many
women. Over forty years after the decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, it seems these
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feminists were not too far off. As this is being written, legislatures across the United States
continue to attempt to restrict access to abortions. In Texas, the Center for Reproductive Rights
has submitted an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court in response to Texas House Bill 2,
which if allowed to go into effect July 1, 2015 will close all but 9 abortion clinics in the state.
Assessing the situation in Texas, one is left wondering what the legacy of Roe v. Wade and Doe
v. Bolton is when such circumstances still exist. Legal historian Mary Ziegler has argued that
Roe and Doe encouraged abortion proponents to fully embrace a rights based argument in
support of abortion, abandoning the once popular argument for abortion as a tool to reign in
population growth. The timing of these decisions coupled with the rapid growth of cultural
feminism in the 1970s has certainly influenced generations of women to view reproductive
freedom as a right, but it has also inspired the growth of pro-life organizations now behind the
increase in legislation aimed at restricting abortion access. It is necessary to consider both sides
of the abortion debate in the decades following Roe and Doe to understand the legacy of the
decisions.
4.1

The Effects of Doe
In the wake of the decisions in Doe and Roe, the immediate effects for women seeking

abortions were significant. Four states had repealed abortion restrictions for at least the first
trimester, while many others had moved to liberalize their laws, such as Georgia. New York was
the only state unaffected. The other three “repeal” states saw their residency requirements
overturned by Doe. Spelling out some of the implications of Roe, Doe held that states could not
outlaw abortions simply because the women who seek them were not state residents, could not
require abortions to be performed in specially accredited hospitals, or that the procedure be
approved by a hospital committee or other physicians. Whereas prior to these decisions, black
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market abortionists were able to help (or hurt) women, together Roe and Doe made abortion
widely available, legal, and safe for women in the United States. Through legalization, the safety
of abortions grew substantially. Within three years of Roe and Doe, the death rate for women
undergoing legal abortions was ten times lower than that of women who had illegal abortions
and five times lower than that for women who opted to proceed with childbirth.3

Figure 4.2 Alan Guttmacher Institute Graph Illustrating Decline in Abortion Deaths4

In the decades since Roe and Doe the abortion rate has continued to decline. In 2014, it
reached the lowest level since the decisions in 1973. Sadly, according to the Guttmacher
Institute, as abortions continue to decline divisions remain over the source of the decline. “The
3
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philosophical divide over what constitutes effective and acceptable ways to further reduce the
incidence of abortion in the United States has never been more stark. The rival policy approaches
— one centered almost entirely on restricting women’s choices, and the other on supporting and
expanding them — have now become mutually exclusive,” policy analyst Joerg Dreweke wrote.5
Even though it’s unclear exactly what’s contributing to the recent drop in abortions in each state,
the correlation between increased access to contraception and a decrease in unplanned pregnancy
has been significantly documented over the last two decades. Teen pregnancy rates have also
dropped to historic lows, a trend that has been connected to the change in social norms
surrounding contraception and increased birth control availability. An additional factor believed
to be behind the decline is the contraceptive coverage requirements in the Affordable Care Act.
A recent study found that women are significantly more likely to choose long-term options such
as intrauterine devices when co-pays and prescription charges are taken out of the equation.
Notably, only two states did not see a decline. Louisiana and Michigan both saw their abortion
rates increase, which researchers attribute to their neighbor states Texas and Ohio respectively.
Texas and Ohio have both enacted some of the strictest abortion restrictions in the country,
forcing clinics to close and women to travel elsewhere for abortion services.6
Less than a month after the decisions, the first walk-in abortion clinic in Georgia opened
to headlines. Opening in Sandy Springs, the clinic was reported to cut the cost of an abortion in
Atlanta in half. Planned Parenthood Association of Atlanta’s assistant director, Helen S. Ford,
told the Atlanta Constitution that Atlanta area hospitals charged $400 to $450, prompting the
organization to continue referring women to New York and Washington D.C., despite the ruling
in Doe, for less expensive abortions. A Georgia woman flying to New York in 1973 would have
5

Joerge Dreweke, “U.S. Abortion Rate Continues to Decline While Debate over Means to the End Escalates,”
Guttmacher Policy Review Vol. 17, No. 2, (2015), 7.
6
Ibid., 5-6.

66

paid roughly $135 for the abortion plus $100 for round-trip airfare. The new clinic charged
women $200 and performed 250 to 300 abortions a month. So while Atlanta’s Planned
Parenthood chapter had 400 referrals a month, sending women out of state, the first clinic was
able to absorb a significant number of Planned Parenthood’s referrals.7
In regards to the discussion of abortion, Roe and Doe had a significant impact. In her
article “The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the Changing Debate on Abortion
Law,” Mary Ziegler explores how the framing of the right to abortion was shaped by Roe and
Doe. Ziegler notes that before the decisions, policy-based arguments were as significant as
rights-based arguments for abortion. Specific policy-based arguments included the connection
between public health and population control.8 During the 1960s, a diverse coalition advocating
for abortion for population control existed, but with decisions in Roe and Doe these
organizations like Zero Population Growth (ZPG) experienced a decline in membership and
members saw a shift in popular pro-abortion support. In their wake, arguments relating to
abortion shifted from the public health driven issue of population control to the rights-based
arguments invoked by Margie Pitts Hames and her fellow second wave feminists.9
Ziegler’s case study examines the evolving strategies utilized by NARAL, NOW, and
Planned Parenthood to illustrate the fluid nature of the abortion debate and how the discussion of
population control and abortion shifted. Beginning in 1967, Ziegler finds that major abortion
organizations began to invoke rights-based arguments. For example, Planned Parenthood
asserted that there was a “right of every patient to decide without coercion of any kind whether
and when to have a child” and that “the right to abortion must be viewed as a corollary to the
7
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right to control fertility which was recognized in Griswold.”10 While rights-based arguments
were present before Roe and Doe, policy-based arguments, which are designed to promote
legislative change, played a greater role in shaping the abortion debate. Georgia feminists
utilized the policy-based argument surrounding public health concerns to gain public support for
abortion reform legislation. Ziegler notes that the political appeal of such policy-based
arguments was less divisive and controversial than rights-based arguments.11 Joseph Nellis of
NARAL explains, “Courts would more easily strike down state anti-abortion laws if the test case
were presented in terms of interference [with] medicine than if it were done on the basis that
many women’s rights groups have advocated—namely, the right of a woman to control her own
body.”12 The appeal of these arguments in Roe and Doe is illustrated by the support of the
American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association. Pro-reform activists
also employed policy-based population control arguments, which they found had broad appeal in
the 1960s. Politicians, judges, and the general population were more receptive to abortion reform
couched in such terms.
With the Court’s decisions in Roe and Doe, the debate surrounding abortion changed.
Where rights-based arguments for abortion had been a part of the rhetoric since the late 1960s,
these arguments gained new significance in the wake of Roe and Doe. Mary Ziegler has
suggested that this is due in part to the rise of anti-abortion organizations hoping to overturn Roe
and Doe. Through a series of discussions, abortion reform organizations concluded that the best
means to defend legalized abortion was to switch to a rights-based argument for abortion.
Second, Ziegler holds that by the mid-1970s, feminist lawyers assumed leadership positions in
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NOW, Planned Parenthood, and NARAL and supported increased reliance on rights-based
constitutional arguments in preserving legalized abortion.13
For Planned Parenthood, the decisions in Roe and Doe were an important turning point
for the organization, leading to the diminishment of policy-based population control arguments.
After the decisions, abortion opponents sent thousands of letters to Congress, criticizing Roe and
Doe, and multiple state legislatures began to consider legislation that would give fetuses
personhood. Nine months after the Court handed down its decisions, Planned Parenthood leaders
met in Denver, Colorado to revamp the organization’s strategy top to bottom. Robin Elliot
summarized the result of the meeting in a letter that the organization must defend Roe and Doe:
“The reversal of the Supreme Court decisions on abortion . . . would merely take the conflict
back one step further. . . This society cannot afford.”14 Deciding this, the issue for Planned
Parenthood became how best to defend Roe and Doe from a constitutional amendment.
Organizers correctly worried that pro-life groups would exploit Planned Parenthood’s connection
to population control, using it against them with minority groups. To counter this, Elliot
suggested that abortion reform advocates utilize a new strategy that reaffirms the “commitment
to freedom of choice in parenthood.” In this illuminating memo, Elliot prompts Planned
Parenthood to draw on the rights-based language in Roe and Doe, and that “an important
thematic idea to be stressed is that abortion in a pluralistic society is to be considered as a matter
for determination according to personal choice.” Understanding the role of rhetoric in the debate,
Elliot explains the need for a “redefinition in the terms of public debate—for example,
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‘Abortion: Is It Murder or Not?’ or ‘Freedom of Choice in Abortion: Is It Necessary or Not in a
Pluralistic Society?’”15
With this shift in argument formally adopted, Planned Parenthood joined forces with the
ACLU’s Reproductive Freedom Project in June 1974. Denise Spalding, the project’s director,
had all publicity and education efforts designed to draw on the rhetoric of Roe and Doe’s rightsbased arguments rather than policy-based or population control arguments. For Spalding, the
Court’s decisions were valuable precedents to be utilized, writing “now we must do the
unglamorous follow-up work to protect each woman’s right to have an abortion.”16 Later that
year, Planned Parenthood also began expanding its argument that Roe and Doe represented a
right to privacy, but also for equal abortion access for poor women and women of color. While
Planned Parenthood always argued that greater abortion access would serve the poor, this strand
of argumentation became more significant with the abandonment of all population control
rhetoric. The emphasis now became one of equal access for all women to abortion services.17
Planned Parenthood’s rights-based strategy was solidified further in 1978 with the appointment
of Faye Wattleton, Planned Parenthood’s first female president. For many, Wattleton’s
appointment signaled that the organization was now fully committed to women’s rights issues
and to the preservation of legal abortion.18
The development of a rights-based argument for abortion also aligns with rise of second
wave feminism and its tenet of equal rights for women. Alice Echols chronicles the development
of radical feminism in Daring to be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975. Echols
charts the emergence of radical feminism in the late 1960s through its rise to dominance within
15
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the women’s movement in the early 1970s. Frustrated by the liberalism of the National
Organization for Women (NOW), which focused on legal reform at the expense of more
meaningful change and the New Left with its denigration of women’s concerns as merely
personal matters not worthy of political debate, growing numbers of young women in the late
60s began calling themselves radical feminists. With their mantra “the personal is political” they
created collectives to develop theory and put it into practice. However, they were also
determined to avoid the elitism of NOW and the New Left. As a result radical feminists fractured
as a movement quickly. They condemned authors who dared to speak for their sisters, struggled
with a division between those who identified as gay or straight in addition to the valorization of
“feminine” qualities as put forth in Jane Alpert’s “Mother Right” in 1973. By 1975, radical
feminism gave way to cultural feminism, which broke with the Left and focused on increasingly
personal concerns, surrendering the political arena to liberal feminists, who Echols argues,
dissipated feminist energy on the largely symbolic and doomed ERA.19
The influence of radical feminism and the decisions of Roe and Doe in NOW are evident.
Founded in 1966 as a women’s rights organization, NOW’s original focus was to address equal
employment opportunities for women. However, in 1967, Betty Friedan, NOW’s president,
suggested that NOW endorse a constitutional amendment either guaranteeing women’s right to
access abortion or one that called for the complete repeal of all criminal bans on abortion. After a
day of debate and one failed vote on a resolution, NOW passed a resolution which called for the
repeal of all criminal abortion bans. From 1967 on, NOW’s arguments for abortion were
grounded in the larger argument for women’s rights. At NOW’s 1968 National Conference in
Atlanta, Friedan summed up their position: “[I]t is the human right of every woman to control
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her own reproductive process, and to establish that right as an inalienable human, civil right
would require that all abortion law be repealed . . . The basic idea of our revolution is, in the end,
self-determination: that you cannot decide anything about a woman’s life, especially such a thing
as her reproductive process, without woman’s voice itself being heard.”20
However, interestingly, NOW activists co-mingled their rights-based arguments with
population control arguments, even aligning for periods with population control groups like Zero
Population Growth (ZPG). Like Planned Parenthood though, a change in leadership in 1974
brought about significant change to NOW’s message. Karen DeCrow, another feminist attorney,
pushed the organization to clarify its stand on abortion, leading the group to publish a Bill of
Women’s Rights to Choose Abortion and designated abortion rights as an organizational priority.
DeCrow called on the board to commit greater resources to the protection of Roe and Doe.21 By
the late 1970s, the true impact of the decisions was solidified. Both Planned Parenthood and
NOW had replaced their policy-based arguments with rights-based ones.
While radical feminism gave way to cultural and liberal feminism, it gave women the
basis for much of the rights-based arguments that developed with Roe and Doe. Influenced by
radical feminists like Ti-Grace Atkinson and Shulamith Firestone, second wave feminism and its
strands of liberal and cultural feminism developed rhetoric of rights and equality for women in
all areas of life, including reproductive control. Major organizations like Planned Parenthood and
the National Organization for Women embodied these changes, illustrating the impact of Roe
and Doe on women. Armed with the language of the decisions, women were now empowered to
claim their right to privacy and expand it to include a right to equal access of services.
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4.2

Backlash
Legal historian Michael Klarman has explored the idea of public backlash against the

Court’s decisions, arguing that when the Court moves “too far in advance of public opinion” its
efforts can “undermine the cause advanced by social movement members.”22 Writing about
Brown v. Board of Education, Klarman notes that while “litigation had performed valuable
service in mobilizing racial protest and securing Court victories, some of which concretely
advanced racial change, it could not fulfill all of the functions of direct action.”23 The
nullification of Brown by white southerners illustrated the limited efficacy of lawsuits alone to
produce real social change. Instead, Klarman argues that sit-ins, Freedom rides, and street
demonstrations encouraged black agency more than litigation, which asked blacks to put their
faith in elite black lawyers and white judges rather than themselves. In addition, Klarman
illustrates how Brown incited a white southern backlash that increased the chances that once civil
demonstrators took to the streets, they would be greeted with violence. It was southern violence
against civil rights demonstrators that changed national opinion. By the early 1960s, northerners
were not willing to tolerate the violence against peaceful black demonstrators, and they
demanded civil rights legislation that directly addressed Jim Crow.24
Can this interpretation be applied to the decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton?
Some critics of the decisions believe they did even greater political damage. In 2013, Supreme
Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg gave her opinion of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton during a
talk at the University of Chicago Law School. Ginsburg called the decision faulty, arguing that it
was too far-reaching in its scope, and ultimately, it gave anti-abortion rights activists a very
22
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tangible target to rally against in the decades since. Ginsburg added that “[Roe] seemed to have
stopped the momentum on the side of change.” Instead, Ginsburg stated that she would have
preferred that abortion rights be secured more gradually, in a process that included state
legislatures and the courts, she added. Ginsburg suggested that a more restrained judgment
would have sent a message, allowing momentum to build at the state level, denying opponents
the argument that abortion rights resulted from an undemocratic process in the decision by
“unelected old men.” In a different strain, Ginsburg also expressed her concern that the decision
was not written to further women’s rights. “Roe isn’t really about the woman’s choice, is it?”
Ginsburg said. “It’s about the doctor’s freedom to practice…it wasn’t woman-centered, it was
physician-centered.”25 Other critics have echoed Ginsburg, arguing that the decisions enabled
the radicalization of gender politics, creating greater extremes than had existed previously. To
better determine the validity of the backlash argument, it is necessary to understand the
development of right to life organizations following the decisions.
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4.3

The Anti-Choice Movement Post-Doe

Figure 4.3 Johnny Fuchko, seven-years-old, holds anti-abortion sign, "Choose Life," at protest on 12th
anniversary of U.S. Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade, in Atlanta, GA, January 22, 1985. 26

While the decisions in Roe and Doe were dramatic losses for those who opposed abortion,
it gave their side both attention and a sense of urgency. Similar to how Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka (1954) set off the white supremacist backlash in the South, Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton gave serious pro-life activists a case against which to react.27 Writing on the
philosophical and political divide of abortion in the United States, Laurence Tribe argues that
Roe and Doe “made concrete for the right-to-life movement the evil its adherents sought to
combat.”28
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In the early 1970s, anti-abortion groups responded to the Rockefeller Commission on
Population Control, created by Richard Nixon, with two arguments. First, they discussed what
the fetus looked like, felt, and deserved as opposed to abortion. Second, they popularized the
“black genocide” argument, which suggested that abortion as a method of population control was
designed to reduce the population of African-Americans or people on public assistance.29 By
1973, right to life proponents had grown in number and become increasingly organized. In
response to the decisions, new organizations were created, including the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Defense of Life, the National Right to Life Committee, American Citizens Concerned for
Life, and the Right to Life League.30 Most were upset that the Court had ruled that a fetus was
not a person, that women were entitled to have an abortion under certain circumstances, and the
abortion law was related to women’s rights.31 While the rhetoric of the anti-abortion groups
criticized population growth and abortion, the decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
provided them with specific targets to refute.
Now when abortion opponents wrote to Congress, they addressed the Court’s holding
that a fetus was not a person and that women had a right to abortion. In a letter sent to NARAL,
the new rhetoric of abortion opponents is made clear: “Every human being gets his or her right to
live, not from the Supreme Court, but from God. . . . Where does the woman get her so-called
‘right’ to destroy another human life? In short, she does not have that right.”32 On the heels of the
decisions, two efforts to counter the impact of Roe and Doe were put forth by abortion
opponents. First, North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms successfully amended a bill on population
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control that prohibited the use of any federal money for abortions. Second, Senator James
Buckley from New York proposed a constitutional amendment which would have changed the
meaning of person in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to apply to all human beings,
“including their unborn offspring.”33
By the mid-1970s, abortion opponents found new allies. Many right-wing organizations,
including the Phyllis Schlafly Report, the American Conservative Union, and the John Birch
Society voiced their opposition to legalized abortion, seeing it as part of the greater decay of
American morality. Much like abortion rights-based arguments became a staple of second wave
feminism, opposition to abortion became linked with the rise of the New Right, the Religious
Right and the Republican Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Conservative groups ensured
that abortion was an election issue, and by the end of fall 1978, it was reported that right-to-life
activism was a major issue in multiple national and state elections.34 Interestingly, Mary Ziegler
writes that working with the New Right pushed abortion opponents to radically revise their
position. Previously, the pro-life movement had not taken a position on major reforms like the
ERA. Other groups like Feminists for Life actively supported the ERA. However, after aligning
with the New Right, organizations like the National Right to Life Committee came out against
the ERA and pushed to end funding for feminist conferences like International Women’s Year.
As a result of this new alliance, opposition to abortion became synonymous with social
conservatism, and pro-choice organizations concluded that antifeminist sentiments rather than
religion or fetal rights motivated their opponents. In 1980, Planned Parenthood president Faye
Wattleton expounded on her opinion of abortion opponents as “an increasingly vocal and at
times violent minority which seeks to deny all of us our fundamental rights of privacy and
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individual decision making,”35 By 1984, it was reported that violence against abortion clinics and
family planning centers was increasing. In 1984 alone, fires or explosions had damaged at least
19 abortion clinics and family planning centers in seven states, including Georgia. In Atlanta,
two clinics, one in North Atlanta and one in Marietta were firebombed in September that year,
causing thousands of dollars in damage. In addition to an increase in violence, it was reported
that clinics also saw a rise in harassment of doctors and patients. Protestors handcuffed
themselves to furniture, slashed tires on doctors’ cars, and photographed women as they arrived
for their procedures.36
The new strategies of anti-abortion groups reinforced this opinion. By the late 1970s,
abortion opponents were working to pass multipart laws restricting access to abortion, through
statutes and ordinances that required informed consent, spousal and parental consent. Other laws
restricted saline abortions, required attempts to save the life of the fetus following an abortion, or
attempted to define fetal viability even narrower than the Court had in Roe and Doe.37 With the
rise of the New Right and the Religious Right, abortion opponents gained powerful allies with
millions of dollars at their disposal to restrict abortion access.
In the decades since, abortion opponents have continued successfully to limit access to
abortions. Beginning in 1977, Republicans legislators pass the Hyde Amendment, allowing states
to deny Medicaid funding for abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or "severe and longlasting" damage to woman's physical health, and in 1980, the Supreme Court upheld the Hyde
amendment in Harris v. McRae (1980), ruling that there is no constitutional right for women to

35

Mary Ziegler, “Beyond Backlash: Legal History, Polarization, and Roe v. Wade,” Washington & Lee Law Review
No. 969 (2014): 1013-1014.
36
James Barron, "Increasing Attacks on Abortion Clinics Raise Fears on Both Sides," The Atlanta
Constitution (1946-1984), Nov 22, 1984.
37
Ziegler, “Beyond Backlash,” 1014.

78

receive abortions at the public expense.38 Three years later in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health (1983), the Supreme Court struck down state requirements that abortions
performed after the first trimester be performed in a hospital, women's right to know laws, and
mandatory waiting periods for the women after information is provided but before she can
consent to the abortion. However, the Court ruled that states could require only licensed
physicians to perform the procedure.39 The biggest rollback of Roe and Doe, however, came in
1992. In Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992), the Court reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld four of
Pennsylvania’s five provisions, including the state's 24-hour waiting period, informed consent,
and parental consent requirements. The justices opted to impose a new standard to determine the
validity of laws restricting abortions, now asking whether a state abortion regulation has the
purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."40 A decade after the
Court’s decision in Casey, Congress introduced a ban on “partial-birth” abortions, which the
Supreme Court upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007).41
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Figure 4.4 Anti-violence signs in the window of the Feminist Women's Health Center, Atlanta, Georgia, January
20, 19851

5

Conclusion

In 1994, CDC researcher and now Emory Rollins School of Public Health professor, Dr.
Roger Rochat found himself once again confronting the inequities of abortion access in Georgia.
“Working again with the [Georgia] State Health Department and [I] learned of the death of [an
Atlanta HBCU] student, a third year student, who had been using condoms. They failed. She
made an appointment at an abortion facility, was deterred by protestors, and went home and put
a—inserted a coat hanger, and subsequently died as a result.”2 In years since the decisions in Roe
and Doe, abortion opponents have taken up more aggressive tactics, including protesting
1
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abortion clinics in cities across the country. Operation Rescue, a Kansas organization, made
headlines when its members came to Atlanta to protest various clinics around the city, including
Atlanta’s Feminist Women’s Health Center. As a result of such protests, clinics have had to take
extra measures to ensure the safety of their employees and clients. Escort services were
developed to ensure that women could safely make it to their appointments in the hopes of
preventing the tragedy Rochat encountered. At Georgia State University’s Special Collections, a
gas mask used by Feminist Women’s Health Center employees to get to their office safely is now
a haunting artifact used in exhibits.
On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court issued its opinions in Roe and Doe, extending
the right to a safe and legal abortion to all women. In a seven-to-two vote, the Court found that
the Texas statute that Roe challenged violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Harry Blackmun observed in his majority opinion that “The Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back…the
Court has recognized that a right to personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”3 Blackmun continued, “These decisions make it
clear that only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty’…are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”4 He later observed that
“most of the lower courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough
to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some
limitations; and that at some point the State interests as to protection of health, medical
standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.”5
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Blackmun concluded that after the end of the first trimester a state could regulate the
abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health. Additionally, this meant, “for the period of pregnancy prior to this
‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State.”6 Because the “compelling” point was at viability, the State could
protect fetal life after viability and could go as far as to outlaw abortions after this point except in
cases when an abortion was necessary to save the life or health of the mother.7
The decision for Doe v. Bolton, again authored by Blackmun, reinforced the notion in
Roe that a woman’s constitutional right to abortion was not absolute. Blackmun invalidated the
procedural conditions of Georgia’s liberalized abortion statute being challenged, citing Roe for
each. First, the Joint Commission of Accredited Hospital was invalid, because the State failed to
show that only hospitals meet the State’s interest in fully protecting the life of the patient.
Second, the requirement that a hospital committee on abortion review all applicants seeking an
abortion, a procedure not required of any other surgery, was unduly restrictive of the patient’s
rights, which are already safeguarded by her physician. Third, the Court found that the
certification of two other state licensed doctors that the abortion was medically necessary had no
rational connection with the patient’s needs, and infringed on her physician’s right to practice.
Fourth, the Georgia residency requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying protection to people that enter Georgia for medical services
there. Thus, just as Roe voided the abortion laws of all thirty states whose statutes resembled the
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one in Texas, the Doe opinion invalidated not only the Georgia law but also the similar reform
provisions that had been adopted by fourteen other states since 1967.8 In regards to abortion, the
Court has relied on the precedent of Roe far more than Doe. Because Roe dealt with an
individual’s “freedom of personal choice in matters or marriage and family life,” it is cited most
often as where a woman’s right to choose originates.9 However, Doe is often cited for its
consideration of the medical practice’s use of therapeutic abortions. Specifically, because
abortion is a medical procedure, “the full vindication of the woman’s fundamental right
necessarily requires that her physician be given ‘the room he needs to make his best medical
judgment.’”10 Additionally, Roe’s protection of privacy (which Lawrence Tribe described as “a
logical extension of Griswold v. Connecticut”) has also been used to challenge same-sex sodomy
laws.
Legal historians have argued that Roe and Doe encouraged abortion proponents to
embrace fully a rights based argument in support of abortion, abandoning the once popular
argument for abortion as a tool to reign in population growth. The timing of these decisions
coupled with the rapid growth of cultural feminism in the 1970s has certainly influenced
generations of women to view reproductive freedom as a right, but it also inspired the growth of
pro-life organizations now behind the increase in legislation aimed at restricting abortion access.
It is necessary to consider both sides of the abortion debate in the decades following Roe and
Doe to understand the legacy of the decisions. Coupled with the rise of cultural and liberal
feminism, women gained the language for much of the rights-based arguments that developed
with Roe and Doe. Influenced by radical feminists like Ti-Grace Atkinson and Shulamith
Firestone, second wave feminism and its strands of liberal and cultural feminism developed
8
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rhetoric of rights and equality for women in all areas of life, including reproductive control.
Major organizations like Planned Parenthood and the National Organization for Women
embodied these changes, illustrating the impact of Roe and Doe on women. Armed with the
language of the decisions, women were now empowered to claim their right to privacy and
expand it to include a right to equal access of services. Conversely, Roe and Doe provided
abortion opponents with a target and contributed to the creation on assorted right to life groups as
well as the rise of the New Right and the Religious Right. With this collaboration, abortion
opponents gained powerful allies with millions of dollars at their disposal to restrict abortion
access.
Reflecting on the legacy of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, Sarah Weddington, the
attorney who argued for “Jane Roe,” writes that she worries the impact of cases is weakened.
Taking in the various decisions from the Court over the years and the continuing efforts by
conservative legislators to restrict abortion access with measures not so different from Georgia’s
abortion reform statute in Doe, she may not be wrong. But for Weddington as well as so many
other feminists, the biggest threat to abortion rights and women’s rights in general is that young
women be ignorant of their own history. In her book A Question of Choice, Weddington
describes an encounter with a young flight attendant:
A few years ago I was wearing a pin on a flight that featured a photo of a coat hanger
with a red circle around the edge of the pin and a red slash across the hanger. I was seated
in an aisle seat, as I prefer. A young flight attendant came by and paused to examine my
pin. She went on down the aisle but returned a bit later to examine it again. That
happened several times. Then she stopped and asked, “What do you have against coat
hangers?” I explained to her the symbolic importance of that pin, highlighting the fact the
liberties established in Roe eliminated the need for women to undergo dangerous back
alley or coat hanger abortion.11
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Dichotomously, Weddington’s flight attendant was unaware of the significance of a coat hanger,
but Roger Rochat’s student was able to learn what it could be used for. These women existed at
different ends of the spectrum, but their experiences in the decades after Roe and Doe are both
dangerous. While it is at first a heartwarming thought that Weddington’s flight attendant not
know the horrors of back alley abortions that feminists worked to end, it is harmful because she
does not truly know what is at stake. She has not heard the stories recounted. Women at their
most vulnerable were taken advantage of and exploited. Worse, they were hurt, sometimes
irreparably. Rochat’s student also living in a post-Roe and Doe world faced the modern
repercussions of the decisions. However, her story illustrates that those horrible stories of
yesteryear are not so far away. Here Dr. John Asher’s words in his first study of Grady Hospital
in 1968 remain applicable. Self-induced abortions remain a measure “always available to a
desperate woman.”12
The dangerous reality of abortion prior to Roe and Doe has been explored by many over
the years, but the story of Georgia women was documented in great detail thanks to the CDC’s
Family Planning and Evaluation Unit and Georgia feminists. Their work along with that of
others allows us to trace the story of Doe v. Bolton, from the high hopes of safer, increased
access to abortion services under Georgia’s 1968 liberalized law to the sad truth of who
ultimately paid the price for inequality in abortion services. Thanks to the costly requirements of
the Georgia’s law, many women were forced to either seek an illegal abortion or attempt to selfinduce through other means often with dangerous outcomes. While the hope was that the new
law would make abortions safer and easier to access, the reality was that such safe and legal
procedures were only available to those who could afford it. Recognizing such inequality in
Georgia, feminist activists were driven to challenge the law, ultimately contributing to one of the
12
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most significant gains in women’s rights in the twentieth century. Arguably, much like Brown v.
Board of Education inspired activists to fight for their civil rights, Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton gave millions of women the understanding and the language to assert their right to
reproductive freedom. Hopefully, through reflection and recognition of what once was, we can
begin to appreciate the significant efforts of feminists in Georgia and nationwide and the battle
they undertook to save women’s lives.
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